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INTRODUCT ION 
The question of obscenity1 often provokes an emotional response 
from the public sector and political authorities. Two schools of thought 
generally dominate the controversy concer.ning obscenity. Some claim 
that s exual expres sion, whether in literature or films ,  is a manifesta-
tion of freedom of expression under the provisions of the First Amend-
ment and that censor ship would contravene such fundamental principle s .  
On the other hand, some perceive obsc enity to be a contributing factor 
toward our moral decay. Whatever the reasons , concern has been ex-
pressed over the availability of s exually oriented material in this country. 
Prior to 1957 ,  state and local governments as sumed a major role 
in regulating the distribution of obscene material. The federal govern-
ment also exercised authority in regulating the distribution of such ma-
terial under its postal statute. Each state governm ent was provided 
with statutes and ordinances designed to protect public morals and fer-
ret out the 1 1  smut merchants" . It should also be noted that definitions 
of what is obscene probably varied from state to state. Undoubtedly, 
problems arose with respect to drawing the fine line between obscene 
l For a scholarly viewpoint on obscenity, s ee William Lockhart 
and R obert McClure, " Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional 
Issue- -What is Obscene ? , " 7 UTAH L. REV. 289-303  ( 1 9 6 1 ) .  
1 
2 
and constitutionally protected material. 
Since the historic R oth decision, however, the United States 
Supreme Court has as sumed the role of final arbiter of obscenity 
statutes and ordinanc e s .  The Court, in addition, has attempted to 
define what is obscene in the constitutional sense. A s  a re sult, the 
highest judicial body of this land ha.s virtually produced a confusing 
picture, often rendering decisions with a hiatus of opinions on this 
seemingly insoluble problem. The situation has been exacerbated 
because the state enforcement machinery has been obligated to adhere 
to the Court' s mandates .  Thus, an increasingly complex situation 
has developed. The two major purposes of this study are to: {I) 
examine and analyze Supreme Court and Illinois appellate court deci­
sions, both substantive and procedural, and {2} review the impact of 
these cases on a number of prosecuting attorneys located within rural 
and metropolitan counties in Illinois 
It should be pointed out that this study will focus on a descrip­
tive method of interpretation. In effect, each salient decision will be 
reviewed to ascertain the disposition of the term "obscene" within the 
meaning of the constitution. Finally, the cardinal aim of analyzing 
the Illinois decisions is to determine whether such cases  conflict or 
comply with the federal decisional law. 
CHAPTER I 
THE FEDERA L OBSCENITY DECISIONS 
The C onstitutional Standard is Pre sented - R oth 
In 1957 ,  the Supreme Court of the United States rendered 
two important decisions pertaining to the question of obscenity. In 
R oth, 1 the petitioner was convicted under a federal obscenity statute2 
for sending allegedly obscene materials through the mail. A lbert s ,  3 
on the other hand, was convicted of violating a California statute 
making it a punishable offense to write or produce any obscene or 
indecent material. 4 At i ssue was whether the alleged obscenity of 
the materials fall within the precinct of First Amendment freedom 
of expres sion. 
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Brennen noted that as  
far back a s  1 79 2 ,  a substantial number of the states had statutes pro­
viding for criminal punishment against obscenity. With this in mind, 
1 3 54 u. s. 4 7 6 ( 19  5 7).  
2 18  U . S . C. Section 1 4 6 1 .  
3 3 54 u . s. 4 7 6 .  
4CAL. PENA L CODE ANN. 1955 ,  Section 3 1 1 .  
3 
4 
Justice Brennen took the position that all areas of free expression are 
not absolute; that the Supreme Court had never extended absolute pro-
tection was extrapolated from prior litig ation. 
Distinguishing between obscenity and ideas, Mr.  Justice Brennen 
recognized that even the most unpopular and unconventional ideas must 
be afforded the full protection of the political system, so long as they 
do not infringe upon other areas of expression. 5 However, he noted 
that obscenity was proscribed by many sovereignties: 
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the re­
jection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social im ­
portance.  This rejection for that reason is  mirrored in the 
universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, re­
flected in the international agreements of  over 50 nations, 
in the obscenity laws of all 48 states, and in the 20 obscenity 
laws enacted by Congress from 1842 to 1956. 6 
Consequently, the Associate Justice ruled that ".  . • obscenity is not 
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press. 1 1 7 Justice 
Brennen rejected the idea to use the "clear and present" danger test 
8 insofar as obscenity is not protected speech. 
5 354 u.s. 481-482. 
6rd. at 484-485. 
7rd. at 485. The Court did not ascertain the quality of the ma­
terial as to be obscene under the test that was prescribed. Brennen 
wrote: "No issue is presented in either case concerning the obscenity 
of the material involved. "  
8see Beauharnais v .  Illinois, 343 U . S .  266 (1951). A lso, in­
terested parties may consult Morris Ernest and A .  Schwartz, C en­
sor ship: The Search for the Obscene {New York: The Macmillan 
C o . ,  1964), p. 205. 
5 
In e stablishing the criteria for determining whether material 
is obscene or not, Justice Brennen offered this proposition: 
Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is  
material which deals with sex in a manner dealing with pru­
rient interest. Material is obscene if ( 1 )  to the average per­
son, (2)  applying contemporary community standards ,  {3)  
the dominant theme of the material taken as  a whole appeals 
to prurient interest. 9 
The Court also concurred in the American Law Institute' s definition of 
obscenity as consonant with the concept of obscenity e stablished in the 
pre sent case: 
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant 
appeal is to prurient interest, i. e . , a shameful or morbid 
inter est in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substan­
tially beyond customary limits of candor in description or 
representation of such matter s .  10 
It was further held that the federal law constituted a proper 
exercise of the postal power as authorized by Congress  and the Califor-
nia law did not impinge against federal postal operations. 
The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Warren is significant 
insofar as  it differ s  from B rennen1 s standards for determining alleged 
obsenity. He expressed his opinion thusly: 
• 
It is not the book that is on trial, it is a person. The 
conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obsenity 
of a book or picture. The nature of the material is ,  of course, 
relevant as an attribute of the defendant1 s conduct, but the 
9 3 54 U . S. at 489. 
lO American Law Institute, Model Penal Code Section 2 0 7. 1 0 .  
T entative Draft No. 6 ,  1957 .  
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materials are thus placed in a context from which they draw 
color and character. 1 1  
A n  1 1 environmental" test, therefor e,  would be more conducive to any 
governm ental suppres sion of obscene material. It should also be 
recognized that Chief Justice Warren1 s opinion repre sented the incep-
tion of the contextual obscenity principle. 
Justice Harlan, who also filed a concurring opinion, deviated 
from the majority for a variety of reasons. First, he advanced the 
argument that the breadth of Brennen1 s opinion was too sweeping to 
such an extent that the Court as sumed the role of classifying material 
as obscene through the use of the prescribed standards.  Moreover, he 
as sumed that the Supreme Court, in construing the federal statute in-
volved in .R oth, should use the following criteria: ( 1 )  the First Amend-
ment; (2) the extent of federal interest in sexual morality; and (3) the 
danger of a single uniform standard of censor ship . l 2 A 11 things con-
sidered, Mr.  Justice Harlan a s serted that the federal power to regulate 
obscenity only falls within the area of "hard core" pornography. l 3 In 
addition, the statute construed in .R oth was unconstitutional since it 
1 1 374 U . S .  476 at 494 (Warren, C . J . , concurring). 
1 2see Tucker, " The Law of Obscenity--Whe:i:e Has It Gone ? ,  1 1  
2 2  U. FLA. L • .R EV .  547, 557 ( 1970} .  
1 3This term usually denoted the graphic and explicit depiction 
of any sexual act. It will be mentioned at various times throughout 
this study. See, cf. W .  Lockart and .R .  McClure, "What is  Obscene, " 
7 UTAH L • .REV . 296- 302 ( 19 6 1 } .  
7 
could be applied to other than 1 1hard core11  pornography. Harlan agreed 
that constructing a national obscenity standard would impose federal 
authority in areas of state control. His rationale for this argument 
rests with the idea that all states may not treat sexual expression in 
a similar manner .  
In dissenting, Justice Douglas, with whom Justice B lack con-
curred, insisted that the provisions of the First Amendment are abso-
lute.  14  This could be  read to mean that governmental attempts to 
restrain speech and press  contravened rights secured to R oth and A l-
berts by the Constitution. Both Justices flatly rejected the majority1 s 
assertion that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech. Moreover, Douglas averred that the Constitution limits 
the government to evaluate the " redeeming social importance11 of any 
ideas. 1 5  If certain illegal actio
.
n can be linked with obscene material, 
federal and state authorities ,  acting in pursuance of the police power , 
may then suppre s s  freedom of expre ssion. A ccording to Douglas ,  a 
lack of information exists showing any effect of obscene literature on 
human behavior. 16  
14  Cf. T .  Emerson, " T oward a General Theory of  the First 
A mendment, " 72 YALE L. J. p. 9 3 7  · 39 { 1 963) . 
15  See Tucker, " The Law of Obscenity, ' '  22  ( 1 9 70} p .  558 .  
1 63 54 U . S .  at 51 1 .  
8 
The Progeny of R oth 
After deciding R oth, the Supreme Court was again confronted 
with a host of new obscenity litigation. In the period from 1 9 5 7  to 1958 ,  
four controversies were adjudicated. As a result, the Court elaborated 
on its explanation of the relevance of the term "constitutionally obscene . "  
A n  examination of these cases I 7 merits some attention to the 
extent that the Court had reversed, per curiam , each lower court 
decision, thus constricting the constitutional standard of obscenity . 
f'he litigation concerned a film suggesting sex, a nudist magazine, a 
homosexual publication, and the authority of federal customs inspectors. 
A cting on each case individually, the Court ruled in favor of the pub-
lishers, basing their opinion on the content of the R oth-Alberts deci-
sion. The judiciary decided that obscenity must represent a signifi-
cant aspect of the material in question, thus establishing an effectual 
definition of obscenity. 
Shortly after 1959 ,  the federal judiciary hand ed down a multi-
tude of decisions, which had the effect of delimiting the applicability 
of the term "obscene. "  
The Kingsley case18  is significant because the Court ruled 
17see Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 244 F. 2d 
432 (7th Cir. 19 57) , rev1d, 355  U . S . 35 (1957);  Sunshine Book Co.  v .  
Summerfield, 249 F .  2d 1 18 (D. C . Cir .  1 958) , rev1d, 3 5 5  U . S . 372 
( 1958) ;  One, Inc. v .  Otto K .  Oleson, 241 F .  2d 777 (9th Cir.  1 958) , 
rev1d, 355  U . S. 372 ,  ( 1 9 58} and Mounce v .  United States,  247 F .  2d 
148 (9th Cir. 1957) , rev1d, 355  U . S. 180 (1958) . 
1 8Kings ley Corporation v .  R egents of the University of New 
York, 360 U . S.  684 ( 1 959) . 
9 
that a state could not ban the showing of a m otion picture entitled Lady 
Chatterley' s Lover. The question to be decided by the Supreme Court 
was whether the advocacy of unorthodox sexual practices ,  in this case 
adultery, constituted speech which was protected by the First A mend-
ment. 
The R egents of the University of New York denied a license to 
the applicants for showing the motion picture; the action was made in 
pursuance of a specific provision of a New York State Education Law. 
The reason spelled out by the R e gents concerned itself with the pre-
sentation of adultery as  a "desirable, acceptable and proper pattern 
of behavior. 11 19 The petitioner appealed to a New York court, where-
upon, the court ruled in favor and instructed the License Division to 
issue a permit for the film' s exhibition. The R egents appealed, how-
ever, and their action was sustained by a court of a pp ea ls.  
The appellate court concentrated on the theme of the film and 
described it as  follows: 
The dominant theme of the film may be summed up in a few 
words- -exhaltation of illicit sexual love in derogation of the 
r estraints of marriage. Their complete surrender to the 
baser instincts was presented as triumph over the social 
mores.  Their decision to live in adultery was quietly her ­
alded a s  a conquest of love over the "form" of marriage. 20 
A s  a r esult of analyzing the film, the court of appeals reported 
l9see H. Glor, Obscenity and Public Morality (Chicago: Uni­
versity of Chicago Press ,  1969), pp. 44-60 .  
20 1 5 1  N . E .  2d 183  at 199 . 
1 0 
that the picture, as reviewed by the R egents, was 11 • • •  utter ly im­
moral in its theme ,  and that it presented adultery as proper behavior, 
was entirely correct as measured by the standards of our community. 
Consequently, the license was finally denied to the petitioner ,  after 
which he sought relief in the United States Supreme Court. 
W r iting for the majority, Justice Potter Stewart held that the 
New York statute was punishing the mere advocacy of an idea, namely 
that adultery may be a satisfactory form of conduct, thus violating the 
fundamental principles of freedom of expres sion. 22  The First Amend­
ment was designed to prohibit states from suppres sing the advocacy 
or expres sion of an idea. A c cordingly, the statute was voided. 
Insofar as the Supreme Court voided the statute, the majority 
failed to concern itself with the power of a state to require film s to be 
licensed prior to exhibition. Justice Frankfurter asserted that the 
Court was abstaining from its authority .to apply the freedom of expre s ­
sion clause o n  a n  individual case basis. Since there was no criteria 
to apply to each litigation, the federal adjudicatory body had the au­
thority to review individual cases.  2 3  
The Supreme Court in 1 9  62 focused its attention on the app lica-
2 lld. 
22360 U . S .  at 688 .  
2 3rd. at 696.  
1 1  
bility of the federal postal statute. 24 The case25 to be reviewed in-
volved the authority of the Postal officials to withhold the delivery of 
publications which appeal to s exual interests of a specific group, male 
homosexuals. 
After examining the material in question, the Postal authorities 
concluded that the matter was obscene; whereupon, the plaintiff sought 
relief in the federal courts. In both appeals, the federal district and 
appellate courts upheld the ruling of the Post Office. This action 
prompted the petitioner to seek relief in the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, was of the opinion 
that the test of obscenity as  prescribed in R oth required additional 
criteria. If material were to be cla s s ified as obscene under the First 
A mendment, it not only had to appeal predominantly to prurient interest, 
but also must be 1 1  patently offensive" or " indecent. 1 1 26 Moreover, 
Harlan recognized that obscene material must go beyond customary 
limits of candor in describing or representing such matter s .  27 Justice 
Harlan, therefore, found that patent offensiveness and prurient interest28  
2418  U . S. C .  Section 1 46 1 .  
25Manual Enterprises v .  Day, 3 70 U . S. 478 ( 1962) .  
2 6Id. at 483. 
27see Tucker, "The Law of Obscenity, " p. 558 .  
28This dual test proposed by Justice Harlan is identical to the 
test represented in the American Law Institute' s Model Penal Code, 
No. 6 { 19 57} ,  Sec. 207. 1 0  (2).  
1 2  
must both be demonstrated to establish that matter is obscene under 
the federal statute. 
Concomitantly, the A ssociate Justice assumed that since the 
Court was construing a federal statute, the "relevant community" 
phrase under R oth was, in essence, the nation. This judgment was 
based upon the fact that the federal anti-obscenity statute reached all 
segments of the country. 29 
In the final analysis,  the Justice focused his attention on the 
content of the material in question. The magazines depicted photo­
graphs of nude males situated.tin provocative pos itions that sugge sted 
a s exual theme. In some instances ,  two males posed together implying 
intimate contact. Harlan was convinced that the publications appealed 
to the "prurient interest" of homosexuals. 30 In his opinion, however,  
neither 11 sordid motives" of the publisher nor the "dismally unpleasant, 
uncouth, and tawdry" nature of their content rendered them obscene. 3 l 
For this reason, Justice Harlan concluded that the depiction of male 
nudes is no m ore  obnoxious to the eye than those of the female anatomy 
that society tolerates .  
A perusal o f  this particular litigation indicate s  that the doctrine 
expanded in R oth is now supplemented with the "patently offensiveness" 
29370 U . S. at 488 ( 1 962) . 
30Id. at 490. 
3 1see Tucker, " The Law of Obscenity, "  p. 559. 
1 3  
concept. The student of public law s hould take cognizance of the fact 
that this decision provided a further delimitation of the m eaning of 
11 obscenity" . 
In 1964, the Supreme Court in Jacobellis v. Ohio32 provided 
another supplemental concept to the obscenity case law. In this case,  
the plaintiff was convicted under an Ohio statute for exhibiting an alleg-
edly obscene m otion picture. 3 3  The state court found the film in ques -
tion t o  be obscene and observed that: 
• • .  The dominant theme of sex is brought into . • •  focus . . • •  
It tantalizes the s exual appetite, • . • •  portraying the charac­
ters in protracted love play . . • •  Very little . . •  is left to 
the imagination. Lurid details are portrayed to the senses, 
sight and hearing. 34 
Justice Brennen, delivering the opinion of the Court, took a dif-
ferent point of view and noted that the motion picture depicted a woman 
bored with marriage, finally meeting an archeologist and falling in love. 
The last portion of the film describes an explicit love scene between 
the two people and Brennen noted that the state based its argument solely 
on this passage. 
A lthough the majority could not agree on a consistent opinion, 
Justice Brennen sought to define a new test for obscenity and to eluci-
date the " community standards" phrase. He stated that the R oth test 
3237s U . S. 184 ( 1964). 
33The film was entitled 1 1  Les Amants" ("The Lovers").  
34state v .  Jacobellis, 1 75 N . E. 2d at 125. 
14 
was far from perfect. A 11 things considered, the A ss ociate Justice 
treated obscenity in a new context. He said: 
• 
obscenity is excluded from • . .  constitutional protection 
only because it is "utterly without redeeming or social impor­
tance, " and that "the portrayal of sex, e. g. , in art, literature 
and scientific works is not itself sufficient reason to deny 
material the constitutional protections of freedom of speech. 3 5 
Brennen converted the te st of the utter lack of " r edeeming social impor-
tance,  11 language which in R oth had seemed merely descriptive of ob­
scenity, into a test of obscenity vel �· 36 Thus, material depicting 
sex that advocates ideas of literary, s cientific or artistic value or any 
other form of social importance may not be stigmatized as obscene. 3 7 
He went further in Jacobellis and stated that the "contemporary 
community standards" aspect of the R oth test meant national rather 
than local community standard s.  38 However , B rennen was extremely 
concerned with the states' interest in controlling such material. States 
may control the diss emination of obscene material, but it was recog-
nized that complete suppre s sion would be unwarranted. 39 
35378 U . S .  1 84,  at 19 1 (citing R oth at 484, 487).  
36see David E. Engdahl, "R equiem for R oth: Obscenity Doctrine 
is Changing, "  68 MICH. L. R EV. 185, 190 ( 1969} . 
3 7  
38  
378 U . S .  at 19 1 .  (Emphasis in the original) . 
Id. at 192 -95. 
39 Justices Brennen and White were concerned over the availa­
bility of such material to children. They approved of state laws de­
signed to prohibit such activities. See also Butler v .  Michigan, 352 
u. s. 3 8 0 ( 19 5 7).  
1 5  
In the last analysis,  M r .  Justice Stewart, who also concurred 
with the reversal, argued that only hard-core pornography may be 
punishable as a criminal offense.  He argued: 
I shall not attempt to define the kinds of material within the 
shorthand description, and perhaps I can never succeed in 
intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, and the 
motion picture involved in this case is not that. 4o 
A short time after Jacobellis ,  the Court reversed two obscenity 
convictions from the lower cour t s .  The Tra lins 41  case was concerned 
with the novel Pleasure Was My Business in which a lower court found 
the publication obscene as  applicable to the federal obscenity criteria. 
On the other hand, the Grove Press42 case dealt with the famous novel 
Tropic of Cancer.  R ever sing each per curiam, the majority cited the 
rationale set forth in Jacobellis; however,  there were obvious differ -
ences of opinion. 43 
In 1965,  the United States Supreme Court decided another ob-
scenity case44 in which the film A Stranger Knocks was enjoined from 
being exhibited by an appellate court ruling. It was noted that the film 
showed two scenes of a man and woman simulating sexual conduct 
40378 U . S. at 197  (Emphasis added). 
4 1Tralins v .  Gerstein, 378 U . S. 576 { 1964). 
42 Grove Press  Inc. v.  Gerstein, 378  U . S .  577  { 1964) . 
43see 378 U . S. 1 84, 196 ,  and 1 9 7 .  
44Trans- Lux Distributing Corporation v .  Board of R egents, 
380 u . s .  259 ( 1965).  
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similar to that of a climactic orgasm. The Court, neverthele s s ,  in-
validated the ruling, citing the Freedman45 case as the only controlling 
law. 
The three aforementioned cases are significant in spite of the 
absence of any rationales because the subject matter depicted a greater 
amount of sexual behavior than those of Ginzburg,  Mishkin, and Memior s .  
Thus, up t o  1966 the Supreme Court had not upheld one obscenity 
conviction. Furthermore, it i s  apparent that the Court experienced 
difficulty when confronted with the obscenity question. This s ituation 
may have been the result of its members' lack of consistency in deter -
mining a valid test for the legal suppre ssion of obscene materials. 
Contextual Obscenity 
The Supreme Court in 1 966 reversed the trend and assumed a 
new posture in the obscenity arena . Some have commented to the ex-
tent that the members of the Court were reacting to public opinion. 46 
Other s  have held that Justice Brennen conformed to the Chief Justice1s 
viewpoint, thus becoming the spokesman for the new majority. 
The Ginzburg47 decision of 1966 is  crucial for a variety of rea-
sons. For the first time since R oth, the Court, in a five to four decision, 
45Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U . S . 51 ( 1 965) . The Court voided 
a state scheme for censoring films on procedural grounds .  
46 A n  example of the adverse public opinion i s  demonstrated by 
the congr e s sional cacophony over Justice Fortas1 obscenity opinions 
during the hearings on his nomination for Chief Justice .  
47Ginzburg v.  United States ,  383 U . S . 463 (1966). 
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upheld the conviction of R alph Ginzburg, a publisher, for using the 
mails to send sexual material designed to titillate the erotic desires 
of its customers .  This decision represented an extreme interpretation 
of the test expounded in R oth because it was predicated upon the con-
cept of "pandering", which was defined as follows: " The commercial 
exploitation of erotica s olely for the sake of its prurient appeal, to 
catch the salaciously disposed . 1148 It should be noted that this quota-
tion is  quite similar to that of Chief Justice Warren' s opinion in R oth. 49 
Justice Brennen delivered the opinion of the Court, observing 
that Ginzburg was engaged in a sordid business  of pandering. Brennen, 
moreover, made reference to two elements of such pandering: ( 1 )  
the nature of Ginzburg1 s mailing addresses ,  5o and (2) his publicizing 
methods. Brennen based his a lteration of R oth on a prior case that 
was concerned with an individual using the mails to exploit the prurient 
interest of sex. 5 1 Concomitantly, Brennen observed that the nature of 
48rd. at 466, 47 1 ,  472 . 
49The defendants • • • •  were engaged in the busines s  of purvey­
ing textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic 
interest of their customers.  They were plainly engaged in the commer­
cial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials with 
prurient effect. I believe that the State and Federal Governments can 
constitutionally punish such conduct. That is all that these cases pre ­
sent to us,  and that is all we need to decide. 354 U . S. 476,  495 -96 
( 1 957) , quoted in 383 U . S . at 467. 
50The distribution points for the material were B lue Ball 
and Intercourse, Pennsylvania, and Middlesex, New Jersey. 
5 1 Interested parties may examine United States v. R ebhunn, 
109 F .  2d 5 1 2 ( 1940) . 
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commercial dis semination could aid in determining whether or not the 
material was obscene. Thu s, this scheme for determining obscenity 
was incorporated into the R oth test. 
R alph Ginzburg and his three corporations were convicted in 
a lower court for violating the federal obscenity statute. 52 The publi-
cations, Liaison, Eros, and The Housewife's Handbook on Selective 
Promiscuity 53 contained various photographs, articles, and es says 
representing human sexuality. One such photograph in the Handbook 
depicted a black man and a white woman posing nude in various positions 
of intimate contact. There were, however, no graphic or explicit pro-
trayals of sexual behavior. The conviction was sustained in the United 
States Court of Appeals .  A writ o f  certiorari was granted. 
It may be assumed that the dissenting opinions of Ginzburg indicate 
a substantial weakness  upon which the majority opinion rests . Justice 
Black argued that the Court was rewriting the federal obscenity law. He 
said that Ginzb.Irg 'Na.S actually "• •• having his conviction and sentence affirmed 
upon the basis of a statute amended by this Court for violation of which 
amended statute he was not charged in the courts below. 1 1 54 In addition, 
he asserted that in applying the tests of obscenity, an individual value-
521 8  u.s.c. Section 1 461. 
53nuring the course of the trial, expert witnesses testified in 
behalf of Ginzburg, asserting that the publications had a vast amount 
of literary and artistic value. See 224 F .  Supp. 129 (E.  D .  Pa. 1 9  63). 
54 383 U.S. at 477. 
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judgment is made of the questioned material. Black noted that there 
is a myriad of opinions concerning the nature of obscenity. He also 
stated that Ginzburg was being criminally punished for distributing 
sexual material which neither he nor anyone else knew were criminal. 
As a result, Black reiterated his view that governments may only sup-
press expression when it is inseparable from illegal conduct. 
Mr. Justice Harlan' s dissent focused on the proposition that 
the Supreme Court erred in its judgment because he thought that only 
" hard-core"5 5  pornography could be prohibited from the mails. He 
was of the opinion that the material did not constitute hard-core pornog-
raphy. Moreover, Harlan as sailed the Court for its interpretation of 
the federal statute, noting that the majority opinion was "an astonish-
ing piece of judicial improvisation. 1 1 5 6 Harlan argued that Ginzburg 
was entitled to a new trial in which the government would have to estab-
5 7  lish the publisher's intentions of pandering lewd and lascivious thoughts. 
Stewart 's  dissent closely paralleled Harlads except for the fact 
that he presented a somewhat lengthy description of " hard-core" por-
nography. 58 Stewart further observed that the defendant was denied 
5 5see 354 U. S. at 507, Harlan believes that hard-core pornog­
raphy can be suppressed by the federal statute. He offers no concise 
definition, however, of what the term denotes. 
5 6 383 U. S. at 49 5 .  
5 7Id. at 49 6. 
5 8Id. at 499. 
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due process of law insofar as the federal statute did not explicate 
whether 1 1commercia1 exploitation, 1 1  " pandering' or "titillation" con-
stituted a criminal offense. 59 
R eaffirming his position on freedom of expres s ion, Justice 
Douglas pointed out that the First Amendment embraces all forms of 
ideas. He was also of the view that the materials presented at bar 
were not obscene. Douglas went on to construct an analogy between 
Ginzburg' s publications and contemporary advertising methods. 60 It 
was his firm belief that a publication should be judged on its c ontents 
and not on the motives or inclinations of the publisher. 
To recapitulate, Ginzburg6l was c onvicted of pandering, that 
is, appealing to the sordid interests of sex through the mailing of his 
publications. The Supreme Court did not rule on the alleged obscenity 
of the articles and magazine�. R ather, the Court formed a construct 
of a publisher' s intent when dealing with sexually- oriented literature. 
However, the Court imposed this limitation on the pandering c.ancept: 
• Only in 1 1close  cases" will evidence of c ommer cial 
exploitation be probative with respect to the nature of the 
material in question and thus satisfy the R oth test. 62 
:-:�?rd. a:t 499,· soo. 
60Douglas found no distinction between an advertisement with 
sexy girls selling a product and the contents of Ginzburg1s magazines. 
Id. at 483. 
61For an interesting discussion of the Ginzburg decision, see 
Notes and Comment s ,  "More Ado About Dirty Books, 11 75  YALE L. J. 
1382 - 1 394 ( 1 9 66) .  
62383 U.S. at 474. 
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Thus, if an erotic publication1 s prurience is doubted by the Court, 
evidence that the purveyor has deliberately emphasized its prurient 
appeal may be decisive. 63 
Another major case64 was decided on the same day as Ginzburg. 
Edward Mishkin was convicted of violating New York1s obscenity statute. 
The publications were written by Mishkin1 s employees and eventually 
placed on the open market. 
Accounting for the content of the publications, Justice Brennen 
first observed that they depicted various aberrations of sexual behav ­
ior. 65 In other words, some of the material portrayed women experi-
encing great pain or being submitted to whippings and torture. These 
types of publications were commonly known as sado-masochistic or 
" bondage material."  It was also recognized that Mishkin1 s employees 
were instructed to create descriptive and perverted scenes of sexual 
behavior that would presumably appeal to certain groups of deviant 
people. 
In his defense Mishkin claimed that his publications dealing 
with sado-masochism should be classified as material which does not 
appeal to the prurient interests of " normal" persons; the Court was 
now faced with the question of whether material having a prurient 
63see Glor, Obscenity and Public Morality, p. 558.  
64Mishkin v .  New York, 383 U. s. 502 ( 1 966). 
65 Id. at 505. 
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appeal to deviates is obscene. 
In response to this contention, Justice Brennen acknowledged 
that the material was clearly designed to appeal to a deviant sexual 
group, which thus satisfied the R oth test where the dominant theme of 
the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of 
members of that group. 66 The Justice observed that the publisher had 
knowledge of the content of the material; this observation was s upported 
by Mishkin' s instructions to his employee s ,  requiring them to create 
specific works dealing with the s exually bizarre. 
Brennen also indicated that the intentions of Mishkin could be 
equated with the " pandering" rule in Ginzburg. It was concluded that 
the publications in question produced the same titillation as mentioned 
in the p·revious case. The only difference, however, was that Mishkin' s 
material appealed to a specific group of persons. 
Filing his diss ent, Justice Black a s s erted that the Court was 
assuming the role of a legislative 'Qody, reviewing each case on an 
individual basis,  and trying to decide what the term "obscene" means. 67 
He was of the opinion that such an " unpopular" and "unwholes ome task" 
should not be as sumed by the Supreme Court. 
In review, the Ginzburg and Mishkin decisions indicate that 
the Supreme Court had adjusted the R oth test to conform to a particular 
66 Id. at 509. 
67383 U.S. at 5 1 7. 
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d. d f d t· t Th" . t· 68 t·1· d au 1ence an manner o a ver 1semen • 1s var1a ion was u 1 1ze 
in Mishkin by focusing on the prurient appeal to a specific sub-group. 
In Ginzburg, on the other hand, the Court concentrated on the method 
of advertising and the intent of the publisher. Hence, it seems that 
the United States Supreme Court has departed from a fixed standard to 
one of diversity. In essence, the nation's highest adjudicatory body has 
now assumed kaleidoscopic qualities when confronted with the seemingly 
impossible question of obscenity. 
The third companion case involved John Cleland' s novel Memoirs 
of� Woman of Pleasure. 69 The Attorney General for the State of Massa-
chusetts had sought a d.eclaratory judgment to determine the obscenity 
of the book. Many scholars of English literature acclaimed the novel; 7o 
however, this failed to convince the Massachusetts court. The state 
court found the publication obscene since it refused to recognize the 
social importance test as a viable criteria to ascertain whether or not 
7 1  the book was obscene. 
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed in a six 
68For a discussion of the variable obscenity standard, see W. 
Lockart and R .  McClure, "Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing 
Constitutional Standards, 11 45 MINN . L. R EV. 5 (1 960). 
69M . emo1rs v. 
cited as Fanny Hil�. 
Massachusetts 383 U. S. 413  ( 1966) (hereinafter 
70some even hailed the work as a ribald classic. The novel 
depicted the sexual adventures of a young girl; certain passages de­
scribed sexual intercourse in vivid detail. 
7 1 206 N. E. 2d at 406. 
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to three decision and held that the Massachusetts court had erroneously 
applied the social value test in R oth. Justice Brennen, writing for the 
Court, argued that Fanny H ill was interpreted to possess cmly a "modicum 
of social value. 1 1 72 However, the essence of Brennen' s holding was 
that all three elements under R oth must caalesce: 
A book cannot be proscribed unless it is found to be utterly 
without redeeming social value • . •  even though the book is 
found to possess the requisite prurient appeal and to be 
patently offensive. Each of the three federal criteria is to 
be applied independently: the social value of the book can 
neitfrer be weighed against nor canceled by its prurient 
appeal or patent offensiveness. 7 3  
According to Brennen, however,. the reversal did not hold that 
the book could not, under any circumstances, be classified as obscene. 74 
If, for example, the material possessed prurient appeal, was patently 
offensive, possessed a modicum of social value, and had been commer-
cially exploited, it could be suppressed. On the other hand, if the 
material had met all of the requisite criteria but had not been commer-
cially exploited, it could not have been suppressed. Justice Brennen 
concluded that Fanny Hill did not fit into the latter classification. 
The dissents by Justices Clark and Harlan illustrate the con-
tinuing disparities of opinions among the members of the Court. Clark 
argued that the majority opinion in Ginzburg and Mishkin had added a 
72 383 U.S. at 41 9. 
73rd. at 41 9 (Emphasis in the original). 
74 See Tucker, " The Law of Obscenity" 2 2  {1970) p. 565. 
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new dimension t o  the Roth standard. Instead of applying the social 
importance test, he insisted that R oth had only two constitutional re-
quirements: 
{I) the book must be judged as a whole, not by its parts, and 
(2) it must be judged in terms of its appeal to the prurient 
interest of the average person, applying contemporary com­
munity standards. 75 
Clark also found that the book1 s prurient appeal undoubtedly lacked re-
deeming s ocial importance and concluded that the publisher1 s purvey-
ance of carnal interests constituted governmental suppression, as was 
decided in Ginzburg and Mishkin. 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan stressed that Fanny Hill was not 
"hard-core pornography" , which would prevent the federal government 
from suppres s ing it. Harlan did advocate that s ince the material was 
offensive, some amount of state control could be justified without con-
travening the First Amendment. This dual standard prompted Justice 
Harlan to express an acrimonious statement concerning the establish-
ment of constitutional criteria for determining obscenity: 
The central development that emerges from the aftermath 
of R oth v. United States,  354 U.S. 476, is that no stable 
approach to the obscenity problem has yet been devised 
by this Court. 76 
77 In 1967, the Supreme Court consolidated three cases into one 
7 5  3B3 U.S. 4 1 3, 442 ( Clark, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 458. 
7 7R edrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767; Austin v. Kentucky, 
384 U.S. 9 16; Gent v. Arkansas, 384 U.S. 937. 
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decision, resulting in the reversal of the lower courts' convictions. 78 
The judiciary announced the decision in R edrup which involved an exam­
ination of the scienter requirement. 79 
In a per curiam decision, the Court reviewed the materials in 
question and held that the states failed to present the following issues: 
( 1) a statute limited to juvenile protection; (2) material imposed unwill-
ingly upon an individuaP s privacy; and (3) evidence of pandering. 80 
Thus, in these cases the Court assumed the following positions: ( 1 )  
the material was not constitutionally obscene; (2) the First and Four-
teenth Amendments protected the dissemination of such publications; 
and (3) the scienter element was not considered. 8 1  
Justic;:e Harlan's dissent emphasized that the Court had evaded 
the scienter issue for which the cases were brought up for review. He 
also asserted that the Court had directly avoided any interpretation of 
the obscenity statutes. 
Subsequent to R edrup, the Court became involved in a plethora 
78The materials pertaining to these cases were common 11 girlie 
magazines. 11 
79The scienter question was first put to a test in Smith v. Cali­
fornia, 361 U.S. 1 47 (1 9 59). It was held by the Court that an individual 
could not be criminally punished for selling an obscene work unless it 
were proven that he knew it to be obscene. 
80386 U. s. at 770. 
8 I rd . 
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of obscenity litigation, 8 2  ultimately rever sing many lower court deci-
sions. The Court is sued its opinions in the form of memorandum 
decisions. Some of the types of material involved were paper -back, 
pulp-type books describing lucid passages of sexual intercourse, sod-
omy and other perversion. In all of these decisions, the Court cited 
only R edrup. 
On the other hand, a considerable amount of the reversals m-
volved movies and magazines83 that depicted photographs of nude males 
and females posing in suggestive positions. 84 In addition, the magazine 
Exclusive85 portrayed women in black stockings and garter belts which 
had the effect of accentuating the pubic area. A gain, the rationale for 
the Cour�s decisions was the R edrup ruling. 
Effects of Sexual Material: Adult--Minor Disparities 
The Court, in 19 68, was faced with a significant question of 
whether a state could make a distinction on the basis of age of the pro­
spective reader. In Ginsberg, �.6 the defe.ri.dant was c onvicted under a 
82Books Incorporated v .  U. S. , 358 F .  2d 935 ( I  st Cir. 1967) ;  
A State v. A Quantity of Books, 4 1 6  ;p .  2d 70�, revtd per curiam, 388 
U. S. 452 ( 1 967); U. S. v. West Coast News Company, 357 F .  2d 8 5 5  
{ 6th Cir. 1 966) .  --
83schackman v . Arnebergh, 387 U. S. 427 { 1 96 7) .  
84 Potomac News Co. v. Virginia, 389 U. S. 47 ( 1967).  
8 5central Magazines, Limited v. U. S. , 389 U, S .  50 ( 1 9 67) .  
8 6Ginsberg v . New York, 390 U. S. 629 ( 1 9 68). 
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New York obscenity statute that prohibited the knowledgeable selling 
of material to minors under the age of seventeen. It was held that if 
the material was deemed obscene it would therefore be harmful to minors.  
An Appellate Court of New York held that Ginsberg had violated the law 
for two specific reasons: ( 1) the content of the magazines conformed to 
statutory descriptions, and (2} the material was harmful to minors 
since it portrayed nudity and directly appealed to the prurient intere st, 
was patently offensive, and utterly lacked social importance. 
Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennen sustained the convic­
tion and observed that the " girlie magazines" were not obscene to 
adults since the statute did not preclude the sale of such material to 
adults . By the same token, the state had utilized a variable definition 
of obscenity 1 1 • • •  by permitting the appeal of this type of material to 
be assessed in terms of sexual interest • . • 1 187 of persons under seven­
teen. For this reason, the majority decided that in situations where 
children are being exposed to sexual material, the state may impo se 
reasonable re straints on the sale to juvenile s of matters relating to 
sex. 
A lthough citing a lack of conclusive evidence linking anti-social 
conduct and obscene material, the Court nevertheless upheld the statute 
as a proper. exercise of the state' s police power. It was recognized 
that the state had legitimate concern in safeguarding minors from ob-
8 7  3 8 3  U.S. at 502,. 509. 
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scene material. 
R eaffirming their prior arguments, Justices Black and Douglas 
d issented, pointing out that all forms of obscenity fall within the pale of 
the First Amendment provisions. Justice Douglas also stressed that 
the Court was assuming the role of the "Nation's board of censors. 1 1 88 
He concluded: 
. . . .  I do not know of any group in the country less qualified 
first, to know what obscenity is when they see it, and, second, 
to have any considered judgment as to what deleterious or 
beneficial impact of a particular publication may have on 
minds either young or old. 89 
Justice Fortas, who a lso filed a d issent, could not draw any dis-
tinction between the material in the present case and that in Gent v .  
Arkansas. 9° Fortas was puzzled as to material read by seventeen 
year olds transforming into obscene material read by sixteen year 
olds. He urged that the Cour.t must determine a proper standard under 
R oth to protect youth. Moreover, Fortas indicated that the petitioner 
had been wrongfully prosecuted for selling magazines which he had a 
right to sell because: ( I )  there was an absence of any pandering to 
children, and (2 )  the state was thereby limiting free access to books 
and other publications. 
88 390 U. s. at 656. 
89 
Id. 
90386 U . S .  767 ( 1 967) supra. 
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The Inter state Circuit 9 l case was the last significant decision 
during the 1 968 term. In this controversy, a Motion Picture Classifica-
tion B oard, acting under the authority of a Dallas ordinance, reviewed 
and classified the film Viva Maria as 1 1 h'Ot suitable for young persons. 1 1 92 
This specific classification prohibited individuals under sixteen from 
viewing the movie . An exhibitor challenged the constitutionality of the 
ordinance on grounds of vagueness. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Thurgood Marshan9 3  held that 
the city ordinance was unconstitutional because of the " vice of vague-
ness" rule. 94 It was observed by Marshall that in prior cases the 
Supreme Court has sustained regulations requiring exhibitors to submit 
films before � review board. 95 However, the Court had also ruled that 
such boards must maintain procedural guarantees96 and act in an equit-
able fashion. 
The Gourt reported that the exhibitor could not determine the 
9 1Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 3 90 U. S. 676 
( 1 968). 
9 2 Id . at 6 7 8 • 
9 3 Justice Marshall's appointment filled a vacancy left by Justice 
Clark's retirement. 
94This concept has been applied to many statutes before the 
Court. It refers to statutes so vague that men of average intelligence 
have to guess at their meaning and differ as to their application. See 
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 2 5 5  U . S .  8 1  { 192 1 ) .  
9 5see Times Film Corporation v. Chicago, 365 U. S. 43 ( 1 961) . 
96Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 5 1  ( 1 965) infra. 
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meaning of "not suitable for young person s . "  Vague standards and a 
lack of the definition of the phrase " sexual promiscuity•• indu<:::ed the 
C ourt to strike down the Dalla s ordinance. The majority concluded 
that in order for officials to apply standards correctly, ·"rea s onable 
and definite11 statutes must be developed. 
In his dissent, Harlan reiterated the dual concept concerning 
the regulation of obscenity; he observed that the states po sses s greater 
discretion in regard to regulating obscene materials. He also noted 
that the ordinance was not vague since 11 • • •  the C ourt demanded 
greater precision of language from . . .  Dallas than the Court itself 
can give . . . .. 97 
Stanley: A New Direction in Obscenity Law? 
Up to the time of the Stanley case, the members of the United 
States Supreme C ourt have demonstrated an obvious inconsistency of ' 
opinion in obscenity cas e s, particularly social importance te st. Stanley 
v. Georgia 98 may have provided a new approach to obscenity regulation. 
Its decision could thus have far reaching implications for the R oth 
doctrine. 
Acting under authority of a search warrant, police entered the 
home of Stanley and searched the premi ses for alleged bookmaking 
9 7390 U. S .  at 709. 
9 8394 U. S.  557  (1 969) .  See Note, 11First Amendment: The New 
Metaphysics of the Law of Ob scenity, 1 1  57 CAL. L. R EV. 1 2 5 7 ,  1268 
(1 9 69).  
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paraphernalia. Finding no gambling material, the police then discovered 
three reels of film 99 located in the bedroom. Using Stanley's projector 
and screen, the authorities viewed the films and concluded that they 
were obscene. Shortly thereafter, Stanley was arrested in pursuance 
of Georgia's obscenity statute for " . • •  knowingly having possession of 
obscene matter. 
" I OO He was later indicted, tried and convicted. The 
Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the conviction, whereupon the defend-
ant appealed to the Supreme Court. The paramount question on appeal 
was whether the state c ould criminally punish individuals for private 
possession of obscene matter. 
W riting for five members of the Court, Justice Marshall reversed, 
holding that mere private possession of obscene material does not con-
stitute a crime. Noting that this litigation was the fir st of its kind in 
the obscenity realm, Marshall distinguished between distribution and 
private possession of obscene material: 
In this context we do not believe that this case can be decided 
on R oth. Roth and its progeny certainly do mean that the 
First and Fourteenth Amendment recognize a valid govern­
mental interest in dealing with the problem of obscenity • .  
(But\ R oth and the cases following it discerned such an " im­
portant interest" in the regulation of commercial distribu­
tion of obscene material. That holding cannot foreclose an 
examination of the constitutional implications of a statute 
forbidding mere private possession of such material. I O I 
99The materials were of the "stag film" nature. 
IO OGA. CODE. ANN. SECTION 26- 630 1 (Supp. 1 968). 
1 0 1  
·394 U. S. at 563, 564. 
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Marshall stressed that there is a fundamental right t o  receive 
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth. l 02 A state 
that regulates what one may see or hear abridges the "right to be free 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one1 s privacy. " 1 0 3  Up-
holding the individuaP s right to privacy, Justice Mar shall observed 
that the appellant was 
. . • .  
asserting the right to read or observe what he pleases-­
the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the 
privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free 
from state inquiry into the contents of his library. 1 04 
The Georgia statute, as it was understood by Marshall, was an 
attempt to protect the minds and morals of its citizens from obscene 
material. The Court rejected this argu!l)ent and summarized the spirit 
of the Stanley opinion: 
W hatever may be the justifications for other statutes regu­
lating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy 
of onel s own home. If the First Amendment means anything, 
it means a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in 
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought 
of giving government the power to control men's minds. l 0 5  
The state of Georgia had submitted another argument stating 
that the law was valid insofar as it would prevent deviant sexual behavior . 
102Id. at 564. 
1 0 3rd. 
l 04rd. at 565. 
1 0 5Id. 
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It added that such material would induce anti- social conduct. 1 0 6  The 
Court overcame this claim, citing a lack of empirical evidence and the 
abstention of the "clear and present danger" test in R oth. 1 0 7  
Justices Stewart, Brennen, and White concurred i n  the opinion, 
but on different grounds. They insisted that the seizure of the films 
was repugnant to Fourth Amendment protections. They also noted that 
the warrant did not de scribe the films; these justices observed that the 
action of the officials constituted a clear violation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. l08 
To conclude, the Supreme Court has professed the following 
viewpoints: ( 1) the private possession of obscene material, viewed in 
the home of an individual, is afforded full constitutional protections 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) the R oth decision 
is not impaired by this ruling; the states still retain broad powers to 
regulate obscenity. 
W hat can one extrapolate from the Stanley decision? First, 
this rule entitles a person to read or view whatever literature he de-
sires in the precinct of his own home. If an individual enjoys the right 
to receive all information and ideas, then, does another individual have 
1 06see "Private Possession of Obscene Material, " 8 3  HARV. 
L. R EV • I, 1 4  9 - 5 0 ( 196 9) • 
1 0 7  394 U.S. at 567. 
l 08rd . at 569 - 572. 
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the right to disseminate ideas to this person? Some have as sumed that 
the right to receive is contingent upon the right to distribute. l 0 9  
R oth concerned itself with the distribution of obscene materials 
and, as already noted, its progeny was concerned with the same issues.  
It seems that the Court has placed itself in an awkward position, uphold-
ing private possession but affirming some convictions for distribution. 
The dilemma, as this author describes it, must be re-evaluated in 
light of R oth. The subsequent decisions may aid in facilitating a more 
lucid perspective of obscenity law. 
More importantly, the Stanley decision indicates a willingness  
on the part of the United States Supreme Court to  place obscene litera-
ture under constitutional protection. However, R oth explicitly held 
that obscenity is outside the pale of First A mendment protection. Some 
scholars believe this to be a classic rejection of the two-level theory of 
obscenity. 1 1  O 
From R owan to R abe 
W ith the effects of Stanley still undetermined, the Supreme 
Court entered the 1969 term with a degree of ambivalence toward ob-
scenity and First Amendment protections. Perhaps the most significant 
l09See Note, "First Amendment, 1 1  57 CAL. L. R EV .  1268-
1280  ( 1 969); R .  Karre, "Stanley v .  Georgia: New Directions in Ob­
scenity R egulation ?i' 48 TEX. L .  R EV .  646 ( 1970} . 
l l Oid. 
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decision that term concerned the right of an  unwilling recipient ' s  com-
plaint about obscene material sent through the mail. 
In B owan, 1 1 1  Chief Justice Burger, speaking for a unanimous 
Court, upheld the constitutionality of Title III of the Postal B evenue and 
Federal Salary Act bf 1 967. 1 1 2 The statute provided that a per son who 
receive-s in the mail a pandering advertisement considered to be sexu-
ally arousing may request the Post Office to secure an order prohibiting 
all further mailings to the addressee.  1 1 3 
B owan, pre sumably, was the owner or manager of several large 
order mailing houses in the California area. He alleged that the statute 
abridged the right to communicate through the mail. In deciding the 
case, Chief Justice Burger utilized a balancing of interests test; the 
Justice as serted that the home owner1 s. right to be free from obnoxious 
material far outweighed the senders interest in communication through 
the mails. Additionally, it was noted by the Court that the receiver of 
such material has unfettered discretion to determine whether it is ob-
jectionable or not. 
The legis lative history of the statute was examined, whereupon 
1 1 1B owan v .  United States Post Offic� Department, 397 U . S. 
728 { 1970) . 
1 1 239 U . S . C .  Section 4009 (Supp. IV, 1 969). 
1 1 3Id. , Section 4009 ( 6). The order further requires the sender 
to delete the addressees name from the mailing list. If the mailer per­
sists, the Postmaster may initiate a hearing to determine whether a 
"lliolation had occurred. 
3 7  
the 6ourt agreed that no scheme of censorship had been delegated to 
the Post Office .  Conversely, the statute was explicitl y· designed to 
protect the privacy of homes from unwarranted intrusion of s exually 
oriented materia 1. 
Burger asserted that if such material was allowed to enter the 
homes of unwilling recipients, it would constitute a form of trespas s .  
He stated that: 
Nothing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view 
any unwanted communication, whatever its merit; we see no 
basis for according the printed word or picture s  a different 
or more preferred status because they are sent by mail. 
The ancient concept that "a man' s home is his castle" into 
which "not even the King may enter" has lost none of its 
vitality, and none of the r ecognized exceptions includes any 
right to communicate offensively with another .  1 14 
With respect to protecting children from such material, the Chief 
Justice emphasized that the statute provided a protective wall which 
would prevent the penetration of offensive ideas. He summarized: 
W e  therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor 
has a right under the Constitution or otherwise ·to send un­
wanted material into the home of another .  If this prohibition 
operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is 
that no one has a right to press even " good" ideas on an un­
willing recipient. That we are captives outside the sanctuary 
of the home and subject to objectionable speech and other 
sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere. 1 1 5  
Mr.  Justice Brennen and Justice Black filed a concurring opinion, 
noting that this statute could give plenary discretion to parents in 
1 1 439 7  U. S. at 737. 
1 1 5ra. at 738. 
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respect to even political, religious, or other views. 
The R owan1 1 6 decision is implicitly related to the rule espoused 
in Stanley. While private pos session of obscene material is  constitu-
tionally protected, in this ruling the Court seemed to indicate a reluc-
tance to sanction unlimited availability of obscene matter. Moreover, 
one can infer that the Court has delegated its authority of determining 
" pandering" or other tests of obscenity to the recipieht of such materials . 
During its 1970 term, the Court handed down a number of obscen-
ity decisions involving statutory construction and customs seizur e s .  
The fir st case 1 1  7 was concerned with the exhibition o f  the film 
I Am Curious (Yellow) in which the state of Massachusetts secured an 
an indictment under its anti-obscenity law. 1 18 The defendants were 
convicted of pos se s s ion of obscene films for the purpose of exhibiting 
them. Upon receipt of this communication, the operator of the movie 
house brought suit in a federal district court, submitting that the statute 
was unconstitutional insofar as no prior adversary hearing �as held to 
determine the alleged obscenity. Moreover, the appellees claimed that 
the standards set forth in the statute had not allowed the motion picture 
to be defined within the limits of R edrup, l l 9 and provided no way any 
l l 6see 1 1  Private Citizen' s Power to T erminate Mailings from 
Specified Senders , "  84 HARV.  L. R EV.  I, 1 1 7- 1 2 7  { 1970). 
1 17Byrne v. Karalexis ,  401 U . S .  2 16  ( 1 9 71 ) .  
l 1 8MASS. GEN. LAWS c .  2 7 2  Section 28A . 
1 19 3 8 6 U .  S.  at 7 6 9 supra. 
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future defendant could 1 1  • • •  know the work to be obscene . "  A three-
judge federal court granted the defendants injunction relief on the grounds 
that further abstention from exhibiting the movie would show irreparable 
harm. 1 2 0  The state appealed, and the Supreme Court noted probable 
jurisdiction. 
In a per curiam decision, the Court vacated and remanded the 
case to the appropriate federal court. It was observed that the district 
court had erred in issuing the injunction since there was no threat to 
the appellee1 s federally protected rights " • . .  that cannot be eliminated 
by his defense against a single criminal prosecution. " 1 2 1  Justices 
Brennen, White, ·and Marshall joined in a dissent, commenting that the 
decision should have been reversed because they found the state had 
neither harassed nor intervened with the showing of the film. 
The �ast two companion cases of the term were decided on the 
same day. Their reversal indicates a reaffirmation of the R oth d·oc-
trine. These salient decisions merit close scrutiny because they may 
clarify the meaning of Stanley. 
In pursuance of a federal statute , 1 2 2  customs officials seized 
thirty- s even photographs l 2 3  from the luggage of one Milton Luro s .  A 
120401 U . S .  at 219 .  Their argument centered around the pro­
position that further delay would result in a substantial loss  of busine s s .  
12  l Id. at 2 2 0 .  
1 2 2 19  U . S. C .  Section 1 305a. 
1 23u.s. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U . S .  363  ( 1971). 
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hearing was held by a United States Attorney, seeking forfeiture of the 
purported obscene material. Luros, however, argued that the hearing 
took too long, whereupon he filed a counterclaim a s serting that the 
materials were not obscene and challenged the validity of the statute . 
The district court found for Luros, holding that the law failed to pro-
vide procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman, and the material in 
private posses sion wa s protected under Stanley. 
The Supreme Court reversed, observing that the procedural 
question concerning the time limit between seizure and judicial resolu-
tion was conducted in a proper manner. To save the statute from invali-
dation, the majority required a prior judicial hearing to provide 14 days 
to initiate a forfeiture hearing and 60 days for the completion of those 
hearing s .  1 2 4  
The Court then concentrated on the more important question of 
whether the photographs seized constituted material in private possession 
as expounded in Stanley. The majority observed that the lower court 
misinterpreted the meaning of Stanley, and ruled that a considerable 
difference existed between reading pornography in the home and pos-
sessing ·imported pornography .fc)r ;·event.ual commerciat dis semination. 1 2 5  
124 402 U . S. at 374. 
1 2 5Luros,  upon seizure of the photos,  had stipulated that he 
intended to use the material in a book called Kama Sutra, which would 
later be published and sold on the open market. 
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Justice White further noted that Congress  may prohibit the importation 
of obscenity from a foreign commer ce by the lawful removal of such 
matter from a traveler ' s  luggage, even though intended for private us� . 1 2 6  
H e  concluded: 
That the p rivate user under Stanley may not be prosecuted 
for posses sion of obscenity in his home does not mean he is 
entitled to import it • • •  free from the power of Congress  . 
Stanley's  emphasis was on the freedom of thought and mind in 
the privacy of the home. But a port of entry is not a traveler 's  
home. His right to be  let alone neither prevents  the search of 
his luggage nor the seizure of . . •  illegal materials when his 
possession of them is discovered during a search. 1 27 
Justices Harlan, Stewart ,  and White issued a concurring judgment. 
In his dissent, Justice Marshall argued that the approach in 
Stanley should have been applied to the present case; that is ,  obscenity 
protected by the constitution when in the privacy of one ' s  home should 
not be differentiated from a group of photographs in an individuaP s per-
s onal luggage. 
Mr. Justice Black also filed a dissent in which he vehemently 
denounced the majority' s ruling for a lack of consistency on the contex-
tual definition of obscenity. Furthermore, he insisted that, since no 
one can properly define it, all forms of obscene material fall under the 
umbrella of the First A mendment. 
Moreover, Black que stioned whether the Court could distinguish 
private posses sion of material from the possession of imported material 
1 2 6  402 U . s. at 376.  
1 2 7Id.· (Emphasis added}. 
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in a person1 s luggage. He offered this succinct observation: 
It would seem to me that if a citizen had a right to possess  
" obscene" material in  the privacy of his own home he should 
have the right to receive it voluntarily through the mail • . . •  
The mere act of importation 
• • •  
can har�ly be more offen­
sive to others than is private perusal in oner s home. The 
right to read and view literature and pictures  at home is hol­
low indeed if it does not include a right to carry that mater­
ial privately in one1 s luggage when entering the country. 128  
The meaning of  this specific litigation indicate s that the Court 
has retre<l;ted somewhat from what was decided in Stanley. To reach 
such a result," the Court had to interpret Stanley along narrow lines ,  
refusing to  follow the implications of a First Amendment rationale, 
which would have protected dissemination. l29 In addition, the major-
ity1 s rationale seems to imply that proscribing the importation of ob-
scene material dilutes the constitutional mandate of the right to receive 
ideas. Thus, in Thirty-Seven Photographs, the Supreme Court turned 
away from sanctioning an unlimited access of obscene material for 
private possession. 
Another significant question was presented in United States v.  
R eidei; l30 an individual was convicted for using the mails to transmit 
obscene materials to consenting adults.  R eidel was sending copies of 
The True Facts about Im p::>rted Pornography through the mails to speci-
12 8 Id. at 3 8 1 .  
l 29see "Mailing and Importation of Obscene Materials, 1 1  8 5  
H_ARV. L.  R EV.  II, 229-237 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
1 30402 u.s. 351 ( 19 7 1 ) .  
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fied adults who had answered his advertisement in a magazine. The 
authorities promptly arrested him for violating the federal anti-
obscenity statute , 1 3 1  after which he filed a counterclaim contending 
that his First A mendment rights were violated because the sale was a 
constitutionally protected delivery. The federal district court held that 
the statute violated the defendant1 s right to send material to consenting 
adults. 
Speaking for the majority, Justice White disagreed with the 
lower court's decision, noting that the circumstances surrounding his 
case were almost identical to those in R oth. It should be noted that in 
R oth, 1 1 •  • • obscenity is not held to be in the area of constitutionally 
protected speech or press  . .. 1 32 White emphasized that R oth was not 
overruled, that it served as  the controlling law in the instant case. 
Stressing the importance of R oth again, Justice White observed 
that the states retain brop.d power to regulate obscenity, absent private 
possession •
. 
He stated: 
Nothing in Stanley questioned the validity of R oth insofar as 
the distribution of obscene material was concerned • . . •  
the Court had no thought of questioning the validity of Sec­
tion 1461 as applied to those who, like R eidel, are dissem­
inating obscenity through the mails and who have no claim, 
and could make none , about unwanted governmental intrusions 
into the privacy of their home. 1 3 3  
1 3 1 1 8  U . S. C .  Section 1 46 1 .  
1 323 54 U . S. at 485. 
1 3 3  
402 U . S .  at 3 54-355.  
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The district court, it has already been noted, gave Stanley too 
wide a sweep by inferring that the right to receive information and ideas 
means the right for someone to deliver such data and concepts to him. 1 34 
White emphasized that, if the Court were to adhere to this method of 
reasoning, R oth would be " effectively scuttled" . Thus, it was held by 
the Court that, whatever the scope of one ' s  right to receive material, 
a s  set forth in Stanley, 1 1 • • • • it is not so broad as to immunize the 
dealings in obscenity in which R eidel engaged her e - -dealings which 
R oth held unprotected by the First Amendment. 1 1 1 3 5  
Justices Harlan and Marshall concurred in the opinion, whereas 
Justices  Black and Douglas dis sented on grounds similar to those elu­
cidated in Thirty-Seven Photographs. 
In review, the Court reversed the lower court' s decision on the 
grounds that Stanley was interpreted too broadly. It was also held that 
R oth was not impaired by the Stanley rule, thus leaving the doctrine in 
effect to adjudicate the present case. Finally, the commercial dissem­
ination of obscene material, as distinguished from mere private pos­
ses sion, was held to be outside the realm of Fir st Amendment protec-
tions. 
This analysis now focuses on the most recent obscenity decision1 3 6  
1 34 
Id. at 355 .  
l 3 5Id. 
1 36R abe v .  State of Washington, 92 S.  Ct.  99 3 ( 1 972) . 
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rendered by the Supreme Court. At issue is a Wa shington statute al-
leged by the plaintiff to be unconstitutionally void for vaguene s s .  
The petitioner in this controversy owns and operates a drive-in 
movie theater. On one particular occasion, the theater offered for ex-
hibition the motion picture Carmen Baby which portrayed sexually 
frank scenes, but contained no explicit sexual behavior. A police 
officer viewed the film for a few days, after which he obtained a war -
rant for R abe' s arrest pursuant to Washington' s obscenity statute. 
Some time later R abe was convicted by the Superior court and this 
conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court. The United States 
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. 
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the Washington Supreme Court had determined the obscenity of the 
movie under circumstances other than the previous tests set forth by 
the Court. 1 3 7  It was noted that if the R oth standard were used , the 
motion picture would have pas s ed the definitional obscenity test if the 
viewing audience were consenting adults .  l 38 Nonetheles s ,  it was ob-
served that the Washington Supreme Court had found Carmen Baby to 
be obscene within the "context" of its exhibition. 
The Court then addressed the question of vaguenes s .  It was re-
ported by the Court that a statute may avoid vagueness  when 1 1  • • •  fair · 
1 37 6· 354 U .s. 47 , 383 U . S .  4 1 3 ,  supra. 
1 38 92 S .  Ct . at 994. 
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notice of certain conduct is proscribed. " 1 39 With this in mind, the 
majority observed that the law made no mention of the "context" or 
location of the film. Thus, the operator of the theater was c onvicted 
( 
of a charge somewhat different from the one he allegedly violated. 140 
In addition, the Washington Court' s interpretation of the statute pro-
vided criminal punishment for exhibiting the film outdoors ,  whereas 
an indoor showing would be immune from prosecution. The Supreme 
Court held that the statute was impermissably vague because " • . •  of 
its failure to give him fair notice that criminal liability is dependent 
upon the place where the film is shown. " 1 4 1  
In conclusion, the Court had taken these positions: ( 1) a state 
must be cognizant to mention. specifically whether a film or publication 
can be determined obscene by its contextual attributes;  and (2) a state 
cannot justify due proc e s s  of law when a person is convicted under a 
charge different from that type of conduct the statute proscribed. 
A Capsule R eview 
One can now assume with confidence that since R oth, the mem-
bers of the Court have adopted a variety of positions when confronted 
with the problem of obscenity; these are summarized below. 142 
1 39Id. at 994. 
I4o1d. 
1411d. 
1 42see P .  Magrath, rt The Obscenity Cases:  Grapes of R oth, " 
SUP • CT • R EV . 5 6 - 5 7 ( 196 6) • 
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I .  Justices Black and Douglas believe that all material is 
protected by the constitution, except in situations where illegal conduct 
is directly associated with a particular form of expres sion. 
2 .  Justice Stewart believes that the federal and state govern­
ments can only suppress material deemed hard-core pornography. 
3 .  Justice Harlan assumes a dual role; at the federal level, 
hard-core pornography is suppressible; at the state level, material 
may be restrained if it is deemed prurient. 
4. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennen and Fortas 
take the position that prurient appeal, patent offensiveness ,  and utter 
lack of social value must coalesce before material may be suppressed 
at both levels of government. In addition, constitutional protection is 
withdrawn if the material is commercially exploited to the extent of 
accentuating its pruriency. 
5.  Justices  Clark and White believe material may be suppressed 
when its dominant interest, as  a whole, appeals to the prurient. 
The incorporation of exploitative context and predominant audi­
ence to whom material is directed into the obscenity tests (Ginzburg 
and Mishkin} certainly broadened the scope of obscenity prosecutions .  
Subsequent to R edrup, the Supreme Court had further limited 
the amount of material within the constitutional meaning of the word 
" obscene, 11 and was reluctant to apply the "contextual obscenity stan­
dard" set forth in Ginzburg. Moreover, the Court indicated a desire 
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to apply the "variable obscenity" rule when upholding statutes providing 
for the protection of juveniles from sexual literature.  
Since the eventful StanleX' decision, the United States Supreme 
Court has a s sumed these additional positions: ( 1 )  whatever type of ma­
terial an individual reads or views in the privacy of his own home is 
sanctioned by the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) addressees 
receiv
.
ing obscene literature in the mail may request the Post Office to 
terminate such mailings by imposing a prohibitory order upon the sender; 
{ 3) R oth has been reaffirmed in that a distinction exists between sending 
obscene material through the mails and examining pornography in the 
home; and (4) the importation of obscene materials can be prohibited by 
Congre ssional authority, even though such importation may be intended 
for private use. 
Thus, the Court has refused to allow an unlimited acces s  to 
obscene materials . A lthough state and federal r egulation of obscenity 
stops at the door to one1s home, commercial distribution and importa­
tion are subject to governmental scrutiny. In effect, what the Court 
has said since Stanley is this: a person may use pornography within 
the sanctuary of his home, but he must choose channels of availability 
other than through commercial distribution or importation from a 
foreign source. 
CHAPTER II 
A PER USAL OF FEDER A L  PR OCEDURA L  
OBSCENITY DECISIONS 
This chapter focuses on federal cases pertaining to procedural 
aspects of obscenity prosecutions.  In e s s ence, the following pages 
will examine the administration of obscenity laws,  censorship boards,  
and procedures employed to secure evidence in obscenity litigation. 
Prior R estraint. 
Our constitutional heritage has witnessed many attempts to 
suppress the activities of the printing press.  In colonial England and 
A merica, powerful interests often practiced the method of restraining 
certain speech prior to publication. This has been commonly known as 
a prior restraint upon the publication of printed matter.  As a result, 
the press has waged a never-ending battle against this form of suppres-
sion, upholding its fundamental right of free speech and pre ss. 1 
It is against this background that the cla s sic Near2 case must 
1 Freedom of speech and press is not absolute. See Jack Plano 
and Milton Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary (New York: 
Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc. , 1967) ,  pp. 63-66.  
2Near v .  Minnesota, 283 U.S.  697 ( 1 9 3 1 ) .  
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be read. The decision marked the first time that a state law was 
struck down as violative of freedom of the press.  At issue was the 
"Minnesota gag law" that proscribed newspaper printings which were 
" scandalous,  malicious, defamatory, or obscene. 1 1 3 The district attor ­
ney invoked the state statute because of a series of articles that attacked 
certain public officials with gross neglect of duty or malfeasance in 
office.  
In a divided opinion, the Supreme Court held the law as repug­
nant to the Fir st and Fourteenth Amendment s .  It was specifically noted 
that although the material may have fanned the flames of scandal, the 
threat to the liberty of the press was a more serious public evil. More­
over, the federal judiciary ruled that the law was unconstitutional even 
though an inquiry was not made into the truth of the charges contained 
in'.the printed article s .  In effect, the landmark decision "nationalized" 
the free speech and press clause s  of the First Amendment, thus afford­
ing judicial protection from national or state impairment. 
The first case4 pertaining to obscenity involved the administra­
tion of an obscenity section of the New York Code of Criminal Proc e ­
dure. The section authorized an official to use a " limited injunction" 
against the sale and distribution of matter found to be obscene by the 
court. If the defendant failed to produce the material in question, an 
3rd. at 698. 
4Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 3 54 U . S.  436 ( 1957).  
5 1  
order could be issued for its seizure. 5 The appellant challenged the 
authority of the order, alleging that the seizure of material constituted 
a prior re straint of free expres sion. 
Justice Frankfurter spoke for the majority and observed that 
protection from prior re straint is  not unlimited . Since the law went 
into effect after the publication of the material, Frankfurter  held that 
it a ssured the dealer protection from an injunction unless  he ignored a 
court order seeking to determine the obscenity of the literature. The 
convictions were upheld, and thus a form of prior restraint was sane-
tioned on the premise that "primary requirements of decency may be 
enforced �gainst obscene publications. n 6 
Chief Justice Warren dissented, a s serting that the methods em-
ployed by the police were based upon their own interpretation of what 
is  "unfit for pub lie use,  1 1  7 thus judging what is  obscene in the absence 
of any standard. 8 Justice Brennen dis sented, noting that the statute 
lacked any provision for a jury trial. Brennen was of the opinion that 
the jury trial best reflects the sentiments of a specific community 
which would therefore be consonant with the contemporary community 
standards test. 9 
51d. at 442. 
6rd . at 440. 
7Id. at 445. 
8Justices Douglas and Black also dis sented stressing that the 
seizur.e of such materials without a hearing clearly violated the provi­
sions of the First Amendment. 
9354 u . s .  at 448. 
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Search Warr  ants I 
The validity of search warrants in obscenity cases came before 
the Court in Marcus v. Search Warrants. 10  This case involved the 
issuance of a search warrant by a magistrate from the state of Missouri. 
On the warrant were the places to be searched and the articles to be 
seized; no adversary hearing was required prior to the is suance of the 
warrant. The magistrate was required to set a date for a hearing on 
the obscenity of the material; however,  no time limit was set. 
In writing the majority opinion, B rennen noted that the warrant 
was overly broad because the police officials had unfettered discretion 
in deciding what materials were obscene. In addition, he recognized 
that the police authoritie s did not choose to submit the material to a 
magistrate for any evaluation of the contents.  B rennen decided that 
states may not use whatever methods possible to decide what is  obscene 
under a constitutionally protected search. 1 1  Finally, the Court ove r ­
ruled the state' s argument that the obscene material was comparable 
to " • • •  gambling paraphernalia or other contraband for the purposes 
of  search and seizure • . • 1 1 1 2  
l0367 U . S .  7 1 7  ( 1961) .  
1 1 Id. at 7 3 1 .  
1 2  Id. at 7 3 0 - 31 • 
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State Censorship 
The question of state censor ship arose in a case l 3 concerning 
the Rhode Is land Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth, a body 
which was statutorily empowered to educate the public concerning ob-
s cenity and recommend prosecution of all violations of the obscenity 
statute.  Max Silverstein, the appellant in this case,  was notified 
numerous times  by the commis sion that a quantity of his booksl4  were 
found objectionable to the sale or distribution to youth under eighteen 
years old. W ishing to avoid trouble, Silverstein retracted all copies 
of the publications from circulation and informed the authorities of 
this action. The appellant sought to invalidate the law and obtain in-
junctive relief from further curtailment of the materials in question. 
Justice Brennen, in the majority opinion, observed that the 
commission sought to re strain the distribution of certain material 
without any judicial determination of its contents .  This prompted 
Brennen to conclude that the commission wa s maintaining an informal 
method of prior restraint explicitly in contravention of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Thus, the Court upheld an injunction against the com-
mis sion. 
Justice Clark concurred, noting that the Supreme Court had 
not pre scribed any standards for Rhode Island to meet. Clark urged 
1 3Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372  U . S .  58 ( 1 963) .  
14The publications in question were copies of Playboy, R ogue, 
and Frolic. 
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that the commission should retain its advisory capacity, but leave the 
issuance of "orders" to law enforcement officials. 
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented, expres sing support for the state 
to exercise its police powers to control the juvenile obscenity problem. 
He maintained that the ·majority' s decision would preclude a legitimate 
interest of the state. Moreover, Harlan noted than several es says 
linked a causal relationship between "obscenity" and juvenile delin­
quency, and on these grounds he would have affirmed the :Rhode Is land 
decision. 
Search Warrants II 
The Supreme C ourt fir st examined the question of prior adver­
sary hearings in the Quantity1 5  case. The Attorney General of Kansas 
obtained an order directing a police official to procure and impound, 
pending a hearing, copies of pulp-type novels at a newsstand. After­
wards, the federal district court directed another order for the destruc­
tion of 1 ,  7 1 5  books. 
Justice Brennen, in writing the majority opinion, found that 
the procedures employed by the state had "chilling" effects upon con­
stitutional safeguards of free expression. It was the Court ' s  position 
that the appellant was denied a hearing prior to the issuance of the 
warrant, thus violating procedural due process of law. The Court 
1 5A Quantity of Copies of Books v .  Kansas,  378 U . S . 2 0 5  
( 1964). 
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also rejected the contention that obscene material is  contraband and 
therefore reversed the decision of the Kansas court. 1 6  
Motion Picture Censor ship 
Motion picture censorship boards came under close scrutiny in 
the Freedman1 7  decision. A film was exhibited at a theater without 
first being submitted for review before a State Board of Censor s .  The 
petitioner submitted that such a procedure constituted a prior r estraint 
on protected expression. Under the law, the Board could censor a 
movie without judicial review, save for an order from the Maryland 
courts rever sing the Board ' s  decision. l 8  The Court also observed 
that the burden of the procedure was placed on the exhibitor. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennen agreed with the petition-
er1 s claims ,  holding the procedure constituted a prior censorship of 
motion picture s .  l 9 According to the Court, the burden of proof should 
rest with'the state when determining whether or not the plaintiff engaged 
1 6rn a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart cited his we 11-known 
hard-core pornography postulate; he asserted that if the books were 
found hard -core, then the seizure of the material would be a legitimate 
exercise of power by the state. 3 78 U . S. at 2 1 5 . 
1 7  ) Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U . S . 5 1  ( 1965 . 
1 8During the course of the Board' s review, no time limit or 
prompt judicial review was established. 
1 9rt should be pointed out that the cla s sic Burstyn v .  W ilson, 
343 U . S. 495 ( 1952),  decision placed motion pictures under the pro­
visions of the First Amendment. 
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in  criminal expre s sion. Brennen further pointed out that although a 
state may review a film prior to its showing, a decision of the Board 
should not affect a final determination of the protected speech. 20 
However,  in this decision the Court left unsolved the question 
of whether or not an adversary hearing should be required prior to an 
injunction, warrant, or other method of prior censor ship. 
Search Warrants III 
In Lee Art Theatres ,  Inc. v .  Virginia, 2 1  the Supreme Court 
again confronted the prior adversary hearing question. One copy of 
a film was seized by state officers from the place of busine ss  owned 
by the appellant. He was later convicted under a state law for pos-
sessing and exhibiting lewd and salacious film s .  The materials were 
seized in pursuance of a warrant is sued by a justice of the peace. It 
was reported that the judge did not even view the film prior to the 
is suance of the warrant. 
Filing a brief per curiam decision, the C ourt avoided the prior 
adversary hearing requirement and held that a police officer ' s  conclu-
sory assertions that a film was obscene did not satisfy the require-
ments of a search warrant. Moreover, it was decided that in the ab-
sence of judicial scrutiny of the materials, the actions of the officials 
20Brennen, however, implied that Maryland could pattern a 
statutory scheme similar to the one pre scribed in Kingsley. 
2 1392 U . S .  636 ( 1968).  
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constituted an arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable search. The 
Court left open the question of whether in film cases a judge should 
peruse a motion picture before issuing an ex parte22 warrant. 
In his dissent, Justice Harlan asserted that a police officer 
should be qualified to seize material prior to an obscenity hearing. 
He also assumed the position that police officers are just as capable 
as  a magistrate when determining probable obscenity. 23 
Obviously, the Supreme Court has not ruled on a specific pro-
cedure of seizing obscene material prior to an adversary hearing. 
This hiatus of opinion indicates that procedures may be devised as  
each specific case comes before the Court. The important question 
remains: should a prior adversary hearing be held before the issuance 
of a warrant or injunction? One suggested alternative to the problem 
would be to examine a film or book only during those hours when the 
public is not normally viewing the material. 24 
Search Incident to a Lawful A rrest? 
On June 23,  1 969 ,  the Court decided a case2 5  in which no war-
22 A judicial proceeding, order, injunction, etc . ,  is said to be 
ex parte when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit 
of one party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person 
with adversary interests .  Black' s Law Dictionary {St. Paul, Minnesota: 
West Publishing Co. , 1933) ,  p. 705-.
2 3392 U . S. at 683. 
24see Notes, "Prior Adversary Hearings on the Question of 
Obscenity, " 70 COLUM. L. R EV.  1403,  1419  ( 1970).  
2 5von Cleef v.  New Jersey, 395 U . S .  8 1 4  ( 1 969).  
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rant was used during a search. The state argued that the search of 
the defendantt s entire house was incident to a lawful arrest. 2 6  
Von Cleef was arrested in pursuance of a New Jersey statute 
prohibiting the posses sion of obscene publications. Without a warrant, 
the police searched the entire 16-room house and found several thousand 
articles that were later ruled as admissable evidence.  The trial court 
convicted the appellant; he then sought relief under the Fourth Amend-
ment in the state supreme court, which affirmed the conv·iction. 
In a per curiam decision, the majority noted that if the rule set 
forth in Chime12 7  was to be applied retroactively, the actions of New 
Jersey would have been declared an illegal search and seizur.e. Never-
thele s s ,  it was held that the circumstances surrounding the arrest con-
stituted a mas s seizure and was wholly inconsistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. 28 It was ruled that the governing principles of R abino-
witz29 were incompatible with the facts in the present case. Accord-
ingly, the Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a 
new trial. 
2 6This is only one exception to the use of search warrants. 
Police may, upon a lawful arrest, search only the " immediate area" 
for evidence in connection with an alleged criminal offense. 
2 7 See Chim el v.  California, 39 5 U . S. 7 52 ( 1 9 69) .  
28 395  U . S . at 8 1 6 .  
29u . s .  v .  R abinowitz, 3 3 9  U . S .  56 ( 1 9 50).  
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Postal Administrative Proceedings 
In January of 1 9 7 1 ,  the Supreme Court consolidated two cases 
into one opinion. 30 The case involved a federal statute3 1  authorizing 
the Postmaster General to return mail to the sender or refuse the pay-
ment of postal money orders in connection with the commercial distri-
bution of allegedly obscene matter. Another statute32 provided that 
the Postmaster General, upon probable cause, could secure injunctive 
relief in a federal court, directing the detention of the seller1 s incoming 
mail pending an administrative hearing. 
In both instances ,  the Postmaster General invoked the statutes  
against two sellers of  allegedly obscene magazines .  The appropriate 
district court ruled against a temporary restraining order and held the 
statutes void because they failed to provide procedural guarantee s .  
Justice Brennen, in authoring an eight-man majority opinion, 
held that the statutes lacked the procedural safeguards expounded in 
Freedman. 33  R eaffirming its position in Freedman, the Court declared 
that the statutes ignored specific guidelines for prompt judicial deter-
mination of the obscenity of the material before it was enjoined from 
being mailed; it was also noted that the statute failed to provide any 
30B l  R . . ount v.  izz1, 400 u.s. 4 1 0  ( 19 7 1 } .  
3 1  39 U . S. C .  Section 4006. 
32 39 U . S . C .  Section 4007. 
33 380 U . S .  51 supra. 
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judicial review of the administrative hearings .  This decision wa s 
very similar to Freedman in which the administrative decision also 
had a censoring effect of finality. 34 Thus, it was held that the statutes 
constituted a form of prior restraint of free expression and that they 
clearly violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments .  
Federal Intervention in State Obscenity Proceedings 
Dyson v. Stein35 presented the question of a federal district 
court intervening in a state criminal proceeding. 36 Stein was the 
owner of the newspaper Dalias Notes and was arrested after a search3 7  
of his house had produced a quantity of obscene pictur e s .  Shortly 
thereafter ,  criminal proceedings were brought against him in a state 
court. 
Stein immediately filed suit in a federal court, seeking injunc-
tive relief against the obscenity statute, whereupon a federal district 
court granted re lief and held the statute unconstitutiona 1. 
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court vacated and re-
mantled the case because the district court failed to show any irreparable 
34400 U . S .  at 417-418 .  
3 5401 u.s. 200  ( 1971 ) .  
36  A similar case was decided during the 1970  term. See Perez 
v.  Ledesma, 40 1 U . S. 82 { 1 9 7 1) .  
3 7The police seized everything except his furniture. A t  one 
point, they confiscated a poster of Mao Tse- Tung, hardly an obscene 
photography. 
6 1  
injury to Stein. This decision was based upon prior cases involving 
f d l . . ff t• d "  . . l . 38  e era intervention a ec 1ng pen 1ng crun1na prosecutions .  
Significant in this case is  Justice Douglas' lengthy and often 
rancorous dis sent. First, he insisted that the police did not know 
what materials were obscene. The police seized everything, effectively 
putting him out of busines s .  Douglas characterized the raids a s  " . . • .  
search and de stroy mis sions in the Vietnamese sense of the phrase. 1 1 39 
He would have ruled the search and seizure as an illegal state action. 
Secondly, Douglas reas serted his prior views on obscenity stat-
utes ,  reading the First Amendment in an absolute manner so as to pro-
hibit governmental suppression of all types of expres sion. He was of 
the viewpoint that obscenity statutes are s o  vague and ambiguous that 
not even an average person could comprehend their m eanings .  Douglas 
provided this cone lusion: 
In these criminal cases dealing with obscenity, we leave 
people confused and in the dark as to whether they are or 
are not criminals . Criminal laws must give fair warning; 
and a person receives no real warning when he crosses  the 
line between lawful and the unlawful, under the T exas statute 
or under the standard approved by the Court. 4o 
Conclusion 
A review of the federal procedural obscenity decisions indicates 
38see Samuels v .  Mackell, 40 1 U . S .  66 ( 19 7 1 )  and Younger v .  
Harris, 401 U . S .  37  ( 1971 } .  
39  
4 0 1  U . S .  at 204. 
4old . at 214. 
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the following positions: 
1 .  A lthough a state can sanction some form of prior review of 
motion picture s ,  basic procedural guarantees must be afforded to the 
exhibitor. In essence, a censor's judgment should not be final; a prompt 
judicial determination should be made available. Moreover, the burden 
of proof rests with the state when ascertaining whether or not a person 
engaged in obscenity. 
2 .  Law enforcement authorities may not exercise broad dis­
cretion to  seize whatever material they may think as obscene. In other 
words, a magistrate should meticulously evaluate whether probable 
cause is justified prior to the is suance of a warrant. 
3 .  A llegedly obscene material is not comparable to narcotics 
or gambling apparatus. Authorized searches should be conducted in a 
manner similar to an ordinary search for stolen money, weapons, etc. 
4. The Court has avoided the issue of whether an adversary 
hearing on the alleged obscenity of material be required prior to the 
issuance of a warrant or injunction. It seems evident that the Court 
is constructing procedural guidelines as each case arises .  
CHAPTER III 
ILLINOIS CASE LAW PERTA INING TO OBSCENITY 
This chapter will review the Illinois Supreme and appellate 
courts' interpretations of the state obscenity statute1 and municipal 
ordinance s .  A n  analysis of substantive case law will precede a review 
of the procedural case s .  
Introduction 
Prior to R oth-Alberts, the states had only ruled on the obscenity 
of film s ,  books, and other materials.  At this juncture ,  it would seem 
desirable to examine two cases decided before 1957  so that the reader 
may understand what standards were used in Illinois to determine the 
obscenity of a publication. 
In 1 9 54, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled on the validity of a 
motion picture censorship ordinance imposed upon exhibitors by the 
City of Chicago. 2 The exhibitors  sought to show the movie The Miracle 
but were required to obtain a permit prior to its showing. The police 
1 The statute, which appears on page 69, will be referred to in 
a variety of cases.  
2 A merican Civil Liberties Union v.  City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 
334, 1 2 1  N. E. 2d 585 ,  appeal dismissed,  348 U . S .  9 79 (" 957 } .  
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commis sioner determined that the film was obscene and denied them 
a license. 3 The primary reason for the denial was based upon the find-
ing that the film depicted 11 • • •  immorality, ohscenity, depravity, 
criminality, incitement to riot, hanging, lynching, • •  · • or burning 
f h b . 1 14 o a uman eing. • • • 
Sustaining the validity of the censor ship ordinance ,  the state 
supreme court ruled that the state has a compelling interest to prev ent 
any overt sexual conduct portrayed by a film. The court prescribed a 
d efinition of obscenity for motion pictures ;  it stated that 
• • . •  
a motion picture is  obscene • • . .  when considered 
as a whole, its calculated purpose or dominant effect is 
substantially to arouse sexual desires,  and if the probability 
of this effect is  so great as to outweigh whatever artistic or 
other merits the film may posse s s .  In making this deter­
mination the film must be tested with reference to its effect 
upon the normal, average person .  5 
On the other hand, the majority was disturbed with the censor -
ing procedures employed by the city. It was observed that the police 
commissioner had made a final decision concerning the film ' s  alleged 
obscenity; he functioned as the ultimate censor. This method was re-
jected and the case was remanded to a trial court for a precise appli-
cation of the ordinance. 
The same ordinance came under attack in the Times Film 6 
3 The mayor also affirmed the decision. 
43 Ill. 2d at 3 3 6 .  
5 Id. at 347.  
6Tim� Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 1 39 F .  Supp . 83  7 
(N. D .  Ill. 1956),  aff'd,  244 F .  2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957) ,  rev'd per curiam, 
355 U . S .  35 ( 1 957).  
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case in which a federal district court relied on the American Civil 
Liberties Union decision to uphold the validity of the ordinance. The 
plaintiffs requested a permit to exhibit the film The Game of Love.7 
However, the commissioner of police, upon viewing the film, denied 
the permit on the grounds that it was not acceptable to standards of 
moral decency. The corporation brought suit in the federal court alleg-
ing that the ordinance imposed a prior re straint on free speech and was 
vague and ambiguous.  
Before the federal bench, a report was submitted on behalf of 
the plaintiffs,  contending that the film did not arouse sexual desire or 
lustful thoughts within the definition of the A C LU case. Furthermore, 
it was claimed that the. state1 s interest in preventing the arousal of 
sexual thoughts in normal persons was not sufficient to justify any 
form of prior restraint on freedom of expres sion. 8 
In answering these arguments, the federal judiciary noted that 
the dominant theme of the movie was sexual, for it emphasized an illi-
cit relationshi.P between a boy, an older woman, and a younger girl. 
It was ruled that within the definition of obscenity in the A CLU case,  
the film expressed a theme of sexual activity solely de signed to arouse 
lascivious thoughts .  
Focusing on the que stion of whether a state' s  interests justify 
7 The film did not explicitly portray sexual activity; rather , it 
depicted a romance between a young boy and a mature woman. 
8 139  F. Supp . at 839 .  
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a prior censorship of expression, the judiciary cited Chaplinsky9 in 
which it was held that free speech is not unlimited and that certain 
kinds of expression may be legitimately suppres sed by the state. Thus, 
the United States District Court held that a state may not have to wait 
until a movie is  shown before subjecting it to judicial review. I O  
The contention that the ordinance was vague was also met by 
the court. The bench noted that "obscene" is synonymous with "immoral", " 
thus providing a definitive standard of conduct to support a criminal 
conviction. Additionally, it was held that to void the ordinance for 
vagueness  would be to undermine the state' s  police power in the area 
of health and morals . 1 1  The court sustained the validity of the city 
ordinance. 
These two cases have provided insight into Illinois obscenity 
decisions prior to R oth. The American Civil Liberties Union decision 
provided the Illinois ·courts with a standard for determining the alleged 
obscenity of materials. The definition set forth in A C LU is quite simi­
lar to the doctrine laid down in R oth, except for the fact that certain 
words like "prurient" and "community standards" are not used. In 
ACLU ,  the court sanctioned a form of prior restraint when it was es­
tablished that the state had a legitimate interest in the morality of its 
9chaplinsky v .  New Hampshire ,  3 1 5  U . S. 568 ( 1942}. 
I 0 139  F. Supp. at 841 (Emphasis Added} . 
l lld . 
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citizens. A year later, however, the United State s Supreme Court re-
ver sed the decision on the grounds that the statute did not provide pro-
cedural safeguards. 1 2  
After 1957 ,  the Illinois appellate courts were t o  b e  affected by 
a number of obscenity decisions rendered by the United States Supreme 
Court. A review of the se decisions now becomes necessary to deter -
mine the direction of the state1 s obscenity statute and municipal ordi-
nances.  
Substantive Case Law 
Chicago' s obscenity ordinance was challenged in the Kimmel 
case 1 3  in which a bookstore owner was convicted of s elling two obscene 
books. The publications Campus Mistre ss  and Born to be Made were 
determined by a trial court jury to be obscene as defined by the local 
ordinance .  14 The defendant appealed for these reasons: ( 1) the ordi-
nance violated the right of free speech; (2) the evidence failed to e s -
tablish either the obscenity of the material o r  scienter o n  the part of 
the defendant, and (3) the ordinance omitted the "utterly without social 
1 2355  U . S. 3 5  ( 1957).  
1 3City of Chicago v.  Charles Kimmel, 31  Ill. 2d 202,  2 0 1  
N . E. 2d 3 8 6  { 1 964). 
1 4CHICAGO, ILL. , CODE SECTION 1 9 2 .  9 ( 19 39): It shall be 
unlawful for any person knowingly to exhibit, sell, print • . .  circulate, 
publish, dis tribute • • •  any obscene book, . . • Obscene is defined 
as  follows: whether to the average per son, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeals to the prurient interest. 
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importance" test. 
The Illinois Supreme Court first observed that in R oth and sub­
sequent cases no exact or precise definition of what is obscene had 
been devised. In addition, it was noted that in R oth the United Stat e s  
Supreme Court upheld the statute, even in the absence of the " utterly" 
test of obscenity. It was also held that the city ordinance was a valid 
means of determining obscenity because the pre sent standards were 
proper to secure a conviction. 
Kimmel also submitted that the trial court did not e stablish any 
evidence of community standards when judging the book to be obscene. 
The Court answered this contention by noting that the defendant offered 
no evidence to the contrary and no testimony of the literary merits of 
the publications. 
A n  examination of the publications was then conducted by the 
Court. It held that although the material did deal with s exual activity, 
both books did meet the 1 1  social importance" test because they con­
tained philosophical arguments on the problems of alcoholism. The 
Court based its decision to review the literature on the standards ex­
pounded in Jacobellis. Furthermore, it was found that the test of ob­
scenity set forth in many of the United States Supreme Court decisions 
guided them in respect to the obscenity of these materials. 
For thes e  reasons, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the 
books did exhibit some amount of social value and did not " go sub-
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stantially beyond customary limits of candor " .  1 5  
People v .  Sikora 1 6  represents a significant attack upon the con-
stitutionality of Illinois'  obscenity statute . 1 7  In this case ,  Mrs.  Sikora, 
a manager of a retail book enterprise, was convicted in the Circuit 
Court of Cook County for the sale of obscene books. The defendant 
appealed, submitting that the state statute was repugnant to the federal 
constitution. 
In the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant asserted that sec-
tion 1 1 -20  of  the state obscenity law was constitutionally infirm because 
irrelevant interpretations of evidence were used to make a determina-
ti on of obscenity. 
Mrs .  Sikora also challenged the social importance test expounded 
in R oth and Jacobellis. The d efendant contended that such a test of 
artistic, literary or social value would be " • • .  irrelevant and would 
have no bearing on the determination of whether or not the allegedly 
1 53 1  Ill. 2d at 2 10 .  
l 632 Ill. 2d 260,  204 N .  E.  2d 768 ( 1965).  
1 7ILL. R EV.  STA T .  ch 38 ,  par. 1 1 -20 { 1963) :  A person com­
mits obscenity when, with knowledge of the nature or content thereof, 
. sells, delivers ,  provides ,  offers,  . • . •  publishes ,  exhibits ,  
• • • •  creates,  buys, procur e s ,  or • . • •  advertises  obscene matter 
with intent to disseminate it in violation of this Section or of the penal 
laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction • • • . 
A thing is obscene if considered a s  a whole, its predominant 
appeal is  to prurient interest, that is ,  a shameful or morbid interest 
in nudity, sex or excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond cus ­
tomary limits of candor in de scription or representation of such mat­
ters .  • . . 
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obscene material is obscene. "  l8 R ejecting this argument, the highest 
court of Illinois cited Justice Brennen' s opinion that obscene material 
must be " utterly without redeeming social value. 1 1 1 9  The Kingsley 
case supported this holding because in it the United States Supreme 
Court recognized that such evidence is essential to a constitutional de­
termination of obscenity. Furthermore ,  if there is an absence of any 
such evidence on which to make a judgment on the social value, a 
" • • •  determination must be made from an examination of the material 
in question. 20 
It  was observed that some justic es favor a national standard 
and others favor local standards.  The Illinois Supreme Court, never ­
thele s s ,  upheld the lower court' s appraisal of the material insofar as  
it was ascertained in terms of  community standards in  the United 
States today, particularly since no evidence of any local or statewide 
standard was introduced at the trial. 
Mrs.  Sikora additionally brought forward the argument that her 
knowledge of the obscene quality of the books had not been e stablished 
by the state. After an extensive review of the defendant' s advertising 
practice s ,  it was found that some books were s ent in unmarked wrap­
pers;  some flyers stated that a few of the materials were banned from 
1 8rd. at 263 .  
1 9 3 7 8 U • S .  at 1 9 1 supra. 
2032 Ill. 2d at 263.  
7 1  
the mails. Moreover, some of the descriptions of the books were 
termed " s ex-hungry, " "passionate, "  1 1 torrid love, 1 1  " lascivious, 1 1  
1 1 lustful, "  and "orgiastic. 1 1 2 1  The defendant also testified that she 
never saw any of the books in que stion. She usually received an order 
with code numbers assigned to a respective book and sent this order 
along with a number to the shipping room for filling. On the basis of 
the se facts, the majority found that: ( 1) 1 1 eyewitne ss  testimony of a 
booksellerrs perusal of a book hardly need be a necessary element in 
proving his awareness of its contents; 1 1 22  ( 2) the defendant was engaged 
in a booksellin.g enterprise specializing in material of a clearly sala-
cious character; (3 )  advertising circulars describing the nature of the 
books were known by the defendant; and (4) scienter was sufficient 
enough to establish that the defendant was selling non-general books 
of an obscene nature.  Consequently, the state' s highest tribunal held 
that the defendant was sufficiently aware of the nature of the material 
to establish scienter. 2 3  
The Illinois Supreme Court then shifted its attention t o  the al-
leged obscenity of the three books. R elying on the standards set forth 
in R oth and subsequent decisions, the court held that Lust Campus, 
2 1 Id. at 264. 
22Smith v.  California, 361  U . S . 147,  154  ( 1 959) .  
2 3rt was held that a bookseller cannot 1 1 exculpate himself by 
studious avoidance about a book' s contents • • .  11 Id. at 1 6 2 .  
72  
Passion Bride, and Crossroads of Lust appealed to a prurient interest 
of sex. It was further ruled that the materials concentrated on explicit 
portrayals of normal and abnormal sexual relations and that neither 
book attempted to discuss any relevant problem that confronts society. 
In conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that: 
Without their obscenity they would interest no one and would 
perform no function. A 11 obscenity is  essentially escapistic; 
it can not be allowed to justify itself on that basis.  24 
In 1966,  the Illinois Supreme Court handed down an obscenity 
d · · 2 5  · 1 · · 1 t' f th M . . 1 C d f Ch' ec1s1on invo v1ng a v10 a ion o e un1c1pa o e o 1cago. In 
the circuit court, the booksellers were exonerated of the charges be -
cause of insufficient proof of scienter; however, the corporate pub-
lisher was found guilty and given a fine of approximately two hundred 
dollar s.  
The cardinal issue was whether the books were obscene as d e -
fined by the governing ordinance. The controlling law was based on 
the constitutional standards in R oth, Jacobellis ,  and Kimmel. 26 The 
court expressed great concern with the perplexing problems of pro-
tecting the individual from salacious matter without arbitrarily cur-
tailing the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free pr es s .  
2432 Ill. 2d at 268.  A Chicago lawyer suggests that all  state 
courts should refrain from adjudicating obscenity cases. See M. Port, " Standards of Judging Obscenity--Who'? What ? Wher e ? "  46 CHICAGO 
BAR R EC.  405 ( 1965) .  
2 5City of Chicago v .  Universal Publishing and Distributing Cor­
poration, 34 IlL 2d 250,  2 1 5  N.  E. 2d 2 5 1  { 1 966).  See also People -;;:­
Charles Kimmel, 35  Ill. 2d 244, 220 N .  E. 2d 20 3 ( 1966) .  
263 1  Ill. 2d 202 supra. 
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In order to judge the alleged obscenity of the material in this 
case, the Gourt drew a distinction between Sikora and Kimmel. The 
publications in the former case were judged obscene to the extent that 
the contents dealt with sexual perversions, violence, and because the 
materials were totally devoid of any social, literary, artistic, or sci-
entific importance. Materials in Kimmel, although portraying sexual 
encounter s,  were found to exhibit some amount of social value. On 
the basis of these past decisions, the material in this 1966 case was 
found to be les s  "patently offensive" than those held obscene in Sikora. 
This summary was provided: 
. • •  
[t)he material here contains substantially less violence, 
there is les s  abnormal sexual conduct, the descriptions of 
both normal and perverted sexual episodes are less  bizarre 
and the total effect les s  erotic . • • .  [n] o cunnilingus or oral­
genital contact is described • • . .  no masturbation, nagel­
lation, masochism or acts of sadism, no homosexual con­
duct is involved, and no voyeurism is discussed. 27  
In conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that material 
dealing with sexual activity, absent perver sion, violence and depravity, 
is constitutionally protected under the provisions of the First Amend-
ment. The Court, therefore, has adopted the position that sexual 
material discussing alcoholism, suicide, obesity, and impotence has1 
redeeming social importance.  
The question of  whether nudist magazines fall within the defini-
. f b . d . h B . · 28 tlon o o scen1ty was pre sente in t e ioc1c case.  
2 734 Ill. 2d at 2 56. 
The defendant 
28People v .  Biocic, 80 Ill. App. 2d 65 ,  224 N. E. 2d 572 ( 1967) . 
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was indicted for the sale of two nudist magazines ,  Nudist Colorama 3 
and Utopia, in the Circuit Court of Cook County. The trial judge found 
that the publications were not obscene according to statutory defini­
tions; whereupon the case was appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court 
for the Second Division. 
At bar the state submitted that the materials in question were 
obscene since they were sold in a place of business  that featured racks 
of numerous " girlie type" magazines and exhibited movies of nude 
women. R es ponding to this contention, the judicial body took note of 
the environment in which the magazines were sold and held that the 
state law does provide evidence to determine obscenity, but such evi­
dence serves only as a guide to the types of evidence which may be 
considered. It was observed that the trial judge considered this type 
of evidence but he ruled that " • • •  obscenity is not a literary conta­
gion which one book can get from another. 1 12 9  In other words, one 
publication is immune from the alleged obscenity of another, even 
though both are lying next to each other on a magazine stand. 
Using the R oth formula, the appellate court then considered 
the character of the magazines in question. The court reported that, 
in spite of the fact that the publications contained pictures of nude 
men, women and children in which their genitalia were clearly exhibited, 
these materials did possess some social value because they contained 
29 Id. at 71.  
75 
expositions concerning nudist living. Various articles in the magazines 
espoused the virtues of the human body and advocated a healthy outlook 
toward the au naturel. There were no indications of sexual activity, 
eroticism, or morbid or shameful interests in sex:. These magazines 
treated nudism as an acceptable facet of our culture and were therefore 
held to pos sess  socia lly redeeming qualities. 3o 
In a final attempt to reverse the original decision, the state 
asserted that as a result of the Ginzburg decision, the defendant should 
have been found guilty of the crime of obscenity because of the context 
' 
in which the magazines were sold. However , the state appellate court 
overcame this a s sertion, noting that the indictments only charged the 
individual with selling obscenity � se,  not " • • •  through the form 
and method of the sale engaged in by the defendant. 1 1 3 1  The appellate 
court affirmed the circuit court1 s decision. 
People v. R omaine32 can be reviewed for two reasons. First, 
the conviction dealt with the pandering concept; and second, the famous 
novel Fanny Hill was questioned for its purported obscenity. The de -
fendant who sold the book was convicted of violating Illinois1 obscenity 
statute in a circuit court, which is a general trial court in the Illinois 
judicial system; he then directly appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court 
30Id. at 70. 
3 1 Id. at 72.  
3 238 Ill. 2d 325 ,  231 N.  E. 2d 413 ( 1967).  
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because defense counsel asserted that the book was protected by the 
First A mendment and there was no evidence of pandering involved. 
The Illinois Supreme Court first observed that a Chicago police 
officer  made the purchase  in the defendant1 s bookstore. The character 
of the marketing was not conducted in any manner that indicated titilla-
tion or pandering to the sordid interests of the customer s .  The novels 
were merely lying on a table marked "New Books, " clearly open to 
any pas serby1 s view. Based on these facts and Ginzburg, the Court 
recognized that there was no evidence of exploiting the prurient interests 
of sex, and it consequently ruled that " .  • • since there  is no such evi-
d ence, the character of the book must be determined from its contents ,  
unaffected by the conditions under which it was s old. 1 1 33  
Focusing on the character of the novel in  question, the Illinois 
Supreme Court noted that some courts throughout the country were r en-
dering conflicting decisions as to the alleged obscenity of this book. 
Nevertheless ,  it was stated that the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Memoirs34 seemed to resolve the issue. 
In the high state court, testimony was introduced to the effect 
that the publication had both literary and historical importance. The 
3 3 
Id. at 3 2 7.  
34The high court overturned a Massachusetts ruling that al­
though the book pos sessed a minimum of literary value, it did not 
poss e s s  any social importance. Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
held that before a book can be proscribed, it must be utterly without 
redeeming social value. 383  U . S. 4 1 3  supra. 
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state, on the other hand, offered no evidence to the contrary; rather, 
the state argued that if the book, as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest and goes beyond the limits of candor in description and repre-
sentation, the publication cannot have any socially redeeming qualities 
which would provide it with First Amendment protection. 35 R espond-
ing to this argument, the Court observed that the nation' s highest judi-
cial body has repudiated such a theory. Consequently, it was decided 
that the Memoirs and R edrup36  rulings could not support a judgment of 
conviction in the present case. 
On November 22, 1968, the Illinois Supreme Court handed down 
the DeVilbiss3 7  ruling which concerned a violation of the City of Blue 
Island ' s  ordinance38 prohibiting the exhibition and selling of obscene 
publications. 39 The defendant was convicted of obscenity in a Cook 
County Circuit Court. Subsequently, the bookseller challenged the 
ordinance in the state s.upreme court, alleging that it denied to him 
the fundamental rights of free speech and press as  secured by the First 
Amendment. The defendant first submitted that neither the character 
35 38 Ill. 2d at 328. 
36  A state may only exercise power to suppr e s s  a narrowly and 
clearly identifiable c lass  of material. 386 U . S. 767 supra. 
37City of Blue Island v. DeVilbiss ,  41 Ill. 2d 135 ,  242 N. E. 
2d 761 ( 1968).  
-
--
38BLUE ISLAND, ILL . ,  ORDINANCE No. 1983 ,  sec.  1 .  4 (4}. 
39The books were entitled Lesbian Lust, Homo Sweet Homo, 
Any Sex Will Do, and Flesh Whip. 
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and contents of the books nor his knowledge of the material provided 
sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. He also a s serted that the 
Blue Island ordinance was constitutionally deficient because it omitted 
the " utterly without social value" crit eria set down in B oth. 
The Illinois Supreme Court initially observed that in Kimmel 
this same C ourt stressed that the federal constitution did not require 
impos s ible standards for determining obscenity. Moreover, the Court 
noted that the language in the ordinance provided an appropriate warning 
as  to the 11 • • • proscribed conduct when measured by common under-
standing and practices�•40 Thus, the Court concluded that it would be 
impractical to incorporate every subtle distinction of constitutional 
declaration into a statutory explanation and held that the ordinance was 
in harmony with the standards defined in the state law. 
The appellant also challenged section 1 .  4(4) of the ordinance 
which dealt with obtaining evidence to show "the degree, if any, of 
public acceptance of the material in this State.  1 1  He argued that this 
section unconstitutionally authorized the trial judge to determine his 
guilt on the basis of what the judge believed to be the public sentiments 
concerning such materials in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court ob-
served that the United States Supreme Court has never resolved the 
issue of whether to imply a local standard or a national standard. 4 1  
4041  Ill. 2d at 1 3 7 .  
41Moreover, views identical to those in the instant case were 
presented in the Sikora and Cusack cases, 1965 and 1 968, respectively; 
in both instances,  the Illinois Supreme Court did not rule on the Illinois 
community standards issue since no evidence of any statewide or local 
standards was introduced. 
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On the basis of this position, the high state court ruled that there was 
no further need to determine what standards were applicable . 
Finally, the defendant charged that the state failed to establish 
scienter concerning the obscene quality of the materials in question. 
The Court noted this contention and observed that a review of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the conviction would be nece s sary to resolve 
the is sue. The four books, it was reported, contained illustrated covers 
of partially clad men and women and descriptive language designed to 
appeal to lascivious thoughts .  The books were displayed in an area with 
similarly illustrated and captioned materials. However,  the defendant 
testified that he did not read or have any knowledge of the contents of 
the publications, and he even refused to sell these materials to p er s ons 
under the age of twenty-one. Basing its opinion on Smith, 42 the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that the publications provided sufficient evidence to 
warrant the establishment of scienter. 
The Court then turned to the que stion of whether the materials 
themselves were obscene. Each publication was found to resemble 
those judged obscene in the Sikora case. Observing that the books 
were 11 • • •  replete with acc�unts of homosexual activity, masturbation, 
flagellation, oral-genital contacts ,  rape, voyeurism, masochism, and 
42Smith v.  California, 361  U . S .  147,  1 54 ( 1 959) .  It was ruled 
that despite a bookseller ' s  denial 11 • • •  the circumstances may war­
rant inference that he was aware of what a book contained. " 
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sadism, 1 143 the Court held that the materials were obscene and appealed 
solely to the prurient interest; thus, it was ruled that these materials 
clearly violated the standards set forth in the city ordinance ,  and 
DeVilbiss1  conviction was upheld. 
City of Chicago v .  Geraci
44 was the only substantive obscenity 
litigation adjudicated during the 1970 ter m .  The defendants had been 
convicted of violating Chicago' s obscenity ordinance for knowingly 
exhibiting and selling obscene material; all eleven appeals were con­
solidated into this opinion in which all of the defendants alleged that the 
publications were constitutionally protected. 
A lthough the Illinois Supreme Court had previously upheld the 
validity of the city ordinance,  it could not avoid making an independent 
constitutional judgment as  to whether the materials constituted obscene 
or protected speech. A lso, the Court noted that the publications were 
not sold or publicized in any fashion that would exploit their purportedly 
obscene contents. Therefore, the materials were broken down into 
categories to facilitate an impartial constitutional determination of 
obscenity. 
The first category of materials consisted of pictorial magazines 
depicting nude male and female models in which attention was focused 
on their genitals;  however, there was no indication of any exp licit 
43 41  Ill. 2d at 142. 
4446 Ill. 2d 576, 264 N . E. 2d 1 53 { 1970) . 
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s exual conduct. A s  for the magazines featuring nude males, the Court 
implied that their intent wa s desigged to appeal to homosexuals. Cit:­
ing a number of United States Supreme Court decisions, 45 the supreme 
judicial body r ever sed each conviction involving materials which de-
picted nude males and held that such magazines were federally pro-
tected expres sion. Similarly, the convictions involving female maga-
zines were also reversed. 
In another category of publications involving sado-masochism, vio-
lence, and brutality, the defendents urged the Illinois Supreme Court to 
hold the statute not obscene since the one magazine involved portrayed 
no s exual relations . The Court subsequently rejected this argument on 
the grounds that the material posses sed excessive sexual aberrations, 
implied bloodshed, and that it contained not the slightest amount of 
social importance.  46 This decision was rendered in spite of the direc-
tion of the holdings in Mishkin47 and R edrup;48 the Court was unable 
to locate any prior United States Supreme Court litigation which 
45see Manual Enterprises v .  Day, 370 U . S .  478 ( 1962) ;  Central 
Magazine Sales Ltd. v .  United States,  389 U . S. 50 ( 1 967) and Potomac 
News Co.  v.  United States ,  389 U . s. 47 ( 1 967) supra. 
4646 Ill. 2d at 582. 
47rn that litigation, the Court upheld the convictions of similar 
publications because "pandering" was involved. 383  U . S .  502 supra. 
48The reader will recall that the publications in R edrup were 
constitutionally protected, irrespective of what obscenity test was ap­
plied. 386 U . S. 767 supra.  
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dealt with this category of material as extreme. T�us,  the Illinois 
Supreme Court made an independent determination of obscenity because 
of the varied interpretations handed down by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
Finally, the novel Love Together was reviewed by the Court. 
This particular work depicted vivid and explicit sexual conduct. A 1-
though an introduction by a doctor was provided to "place the novel into 
some psychological perspective, 1 149 the Illinois Supreme Court held the 
novel to be obscene because it appealed to a prurient interest in sex. 
Two significant issues were raised in City of Moline v .  Walker. 5o 
First, a R ock Island Circuit Court dismissed complaints against the 
defendant for selling obscene books and declared that the City of Moline 
was arbitrarily trying to suppress  material that citizens read. Second, 
the circuit court held that the sale of obscene material to adults is now 
within the precinct of the First Amendment. 5 1  Moline then appealed 
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. 
The defendant first submitted that the Moline ordinance was 
hostile to the constitution because it omitted the following three cri­
teria which were elucidated in R edrup: {l) the statute failed to provide 
a concern for juveniles; (2) the statute lacked any suggestion of obscene 
49 46 Ill. 2d at 583. 
5o49 Ill. 2d 392, 274 N . E. 2d 9 ( 1 9 7 1 ) .  
5 1  Id. at 393.  
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material being thrust upon an unwilling recipient so as to  make it im -
possible to avoid exposure to it; and {3} the statute did not mention any 
evidence of " pandering" . 52 In answering these contentions, the Court 
maintained that R eide153 had overruled these criteria which the defend-
ant had as serted should have been incorporated into Moline ' s  obscenity 
ordinance. Moreover, the R eidel decision effectively reaffirmed R oth 
and construed Stanley54 in the narrowest fashion. The Illinois Supreme 
Court noted that Justice Harlan' s concurring opinion in R eidel rejected 
the proposition that the First A mendment carries the " right to receive" 
obscene material through any channel of distribution provided that safe-
guards are taken to prevent the dissemination to unwilling adults and 
children. 
55 Concomittantly, it was observed by this Court that with 
respect to obscenity laws involving children and unconsenting adults ,  
the authority to  affect changes in such laws " lies with those who pas s ,  
repeal, and amend statutes and ordinances • . •  n56 The Supreme Court 
of Illinois concluded that the R eidel decision, " . . .  in effect, over-
ruled R edrup and leaves R oth intact without the R edrup restrictions . "  57 
52Id . at 395 .  
53402 U.  s. 3 5 1  supra. 
54The essence of Stanley means that private posses sion of ob­
scene material in one ' s  home is constitutionally sanctioned. 394 U . S .  
557 supra. 
55402 U . S .  at 357 .  
56Id . 
57  49 Ill. 2d at 396.  The restrictions in R edrup centered around 
the idea that the se provisions must be incorporated into obscenity stat­
utes:  protection of juveniles and unwilling adults from obscene material, 
and the "pandering" concept. 
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Hence, the judgment of the lower court was reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings .  
The Illinois Supreme Court, in another opinion announced on 
the same day as Walker, decided that the contemporary community 
standards criterion was applicable on a statewide, but not a county-by­
county standard. In the Butler 58 case, the defendant was convicted in 
the Vermilion County Circuit Court of violating the state obscenity stat­
ute for showing the movie Vixen. The movie was exhibited in a number 
of theaters throughout the state. 
In the circuit court, the jury was instructed to determine the 
movie' s  alleged obscenity in accordance with the state obscenity statute. 
There we·re no instructions given to the jury as to the "scope or breadth 
of the community by whose contemporary standards the alleged obscen­
ity of the film was to be judged . "  59 However,  the judge and the State' s  
Attorney instructed the jury that they could find the motion picture ob­
scene if it offended the community standards of Vermilion County. 
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant claimed that 
the circuit court had erred in applying a countywide standard in d�te r ­
mining the film' s obscenity. R eviewing R oth and Jacobellis ,  the su­
preme court reported that there have been inconsistencies with respect 
to what type of community standard to apply. Some justices have ad-
58 Peop le v .  Butler ,  49 Ill. 2d 435, 275  N. E. 2d 400 ( 19 7 1 } .  
59 Id. at 436. 
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vocated national standards; other s favor local standards;  and still 
others advocate that all obscenity is protected by the First Amendment. 
Whatever the interpretations, the high state court found it unnece s sary 
to determine which standard had been mandated by the federal courts .  
The judiciary then focused on subsection ( c) ( 4) o f  the state obscenity 
law which concerned the admis sability of evidence and the "degree, if 
any, of public acceptance of the material in this state. 1 1 60 In interpret-
ing this subsection, it was held that the trial court misconstrued the 
application of the community standards criterion. Accordingly, the 
Illinois Supreme C ourt reversed the conviction and held that the statute 
contemplated a statewide standard and not a standard that varies from 
one county to another .  6 l 
On March 2 1 ,  1972 ,  the Illinois Supreme Court issued its most 
d . . 62 . b •t 1 t" re cent ec1sion concerning o scen1 y regu a ion. Three judgments 
from the Circuit Court of W innebago County were consolidated for 
argument and opinion. In each instance ,  the defendants were charged 
with and convicted for selling allegedly obscene books. A s  a r esult, 
they immediately appealed to this Court seeking relief to dismiss the 
charges on the grounds that: ( 1 ) no prior adversary hearing was held 
on the question of obscenity; {2) the distribution of such material to 
60 ILL. R EV .  STAT. ch. 38, par. 1 1 -20 ( c) (4) 1 969 .  
6 149 Ill. 2d  at 438. 
62P eople v. R idens , 51 ILL. 2d 410 ,  282 N. E. 2d 69 1 ( 1972) .  
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adults is constitutionally protected; ( 3) section 1 1 - 20 ( 6) of the state 
anti-obscenity law is vague because it is not compatible with United 
States Supreme Court decisions; and {4) the state failed to define a 
criminal offense .  Another defendant argued that the Moline city ordb­
nance was violative of the federal constitution on similar ground s .  63 
The Illinois Supreme Court initially recognized that the Moline 
ordinance was consistent with standards for judging obscenity under the 
R oth doctrine. Insofar as section 1 1 -20 ( 6) of the state law was con­
cerned, the Court examined its construction and upheld its validity 
based on the Kimmel and Sikora decisions. It was further claimed by 
the defendants that the ordinance and statute were d eficient because 
they should have provided proof to show that the publications were 
thrust upon unconsenting adults or minors.  This allegation was also 
met with rejection since the state supreme court ' s  ruling in Walker 
refused to incorporate these restrictions into statutory definitions of 
obscenity. 
Defendants also advanced the position that the state had failed 
to provide additional testimony or evidence in determining the obscen­
ity of the magazines because the plaintiffs had introduced only the 
offending publications in court. The defendants asserted that this 
would place the court in a position of a 11 • • •  self-appointed censor 
of published materials • • •  , " contrary to constitutional protections. 64 
6 3 Id. at 41  3 • 
64Id. at 415 .  
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Since there was no te stimony introduced other than the pictorial maga­
zines, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that " in the absence of such 
evidence ,  the triers of fact are the exclusive judges of what the com­
mon conscience of the community is.  1 1 65 Thus, the magazines alone 
provided sufficient evidence to secure a judicial determination of ob­
scenity. 
The contention that an adversary hearing on the question of ob­
scenity was required prior to the issuance of the warrants was also 
brought before the Court. The defendants cited the Kimme166 case in 
wb.ich a conviction was overturned because of unreasonable seizure; 
however, the state supreme court noted that no search or seizure was 
conducted in the present case. Conver sely. the arrest was made after 
the police officers purchased the mate rials, and the defendants' busi­
nesses were not impaired. Thus, the Court found this allegation inap­
plicable. 
Subsequently, the Court turned to the propriety of the trial 
court' s ruling that the materials in question were obscene as defined 
in the city ordinance and state statute. It was observed that the maga­
zines contained color pictures of nude male and female models posed 
in seductive embraces with their legs spread
. 
so as to accentuate the 
genital area. There was no indication of any sexual activity, but the 
65 R oth v.  U . S .  354 U . S . at 490,  supra. 
6634 Ill. 2d 578 . 
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Court maintained that sexual relations in the photographs were 1 1  sug-
d d . . . .  67 geste an imminent. The contents of the magazines were sum-
marized: 
The models in many instances have their hand s ,  or mouths ,  
close to  another' s genitals,  suggestive of abnormal sexual 
conduct. The females are posed with their heads close to 
the male sex organ, and vice versa • •  � . s everal naked 
models are photographed while lying on top of one anbther 
• • • .  
two females are shown fondling one male. In these 
pictures ,  the focal point is the genitals of the parties. 68 
A 11 things considered, it was held by the Illinois Supreme Court that 
the materials fell within the definition of obscenity and did not possess  
the slightest modicum of redeeming social value. 
Summary 
A perusal of the major Illinois obscenity decisions reveals the 
following positions: 
1 .  The R oth and subsequent decisions set forth by the United 
States Supreme Court have been closely adhered to in Illinois obscenity 
cases involving statutory definitions. Moreover, the 1 1  socially redeem-
ing value" criteria of obscenity has been construed to exclude a limited 
amount of obscene material. City ordinances ,  however, have be en up-
held even in the absence of such criteria. 
2 .  Material dealing with sex is constitutionally protected as 
long as  it is devoid of explicit sexual behavior, violence, sadomaso-
6 7 5 1  Ill. 2d at 41  7.  
68Id . 
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chism, and perversions. In addition, nudity is not synonymous with 
obscenity; that is ,  material e spousing the virtues and philosophy of 
nudism has redeeming social importance. 
3 .  The intentions and advertising practices of a publisher or 
bookseller have been considered as significant with respect to securing 
a judicial determination of obscenity. 
4.  The high state court has read :R eidel to overrule the :R edrup 
restrictions. In other words, it has been decided that obscenity stat­
utes and ordinance s  that do not incorporate provisions mentioning 
juveniles ,  unwilling adults ,  and 1 1pandering" are constitutionally valid. 
5.  There seems to be some amount of confusion as  to whether 
a local or national community standard should be applied to obscenity 
litigation. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court has avoided the issue 
because the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on which stan­
dard is applicable. fyiore specifically, it has been held that community 
standard s in Illinois refer to the entire state; thus such standards on a 
statewide basis cannot vary from county to county. 
W ithin the last two years,  however, the Illinois Supreme Court 
has rendered some confusing opinions concerning what types of material 
can be proscribed. On the one hand, it has been noted that material 
depicting violence, bloodshed, and excessive sexual aberrations may 
be legally suppressed, even if such material does not describe explicit 
sexual conduct. On the other hand, material that lacks the aforemen-
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tioned, but portrays s exual relations in a " s uggestive and imminent" 
manner may also be proscribed. Thus , the high court of Illinois has 
indicated a willingnes s  to prohibit the distribution of material that does 
not de scribe or rep re sent graphic sexual behavior. Some authorities 
would consider this to be a broadening of the state' s power to legally 
suppress material of a different degree in comparison to 1 'hard- core 
pornography. 1 1 
Procedural Case Law 
In 1 9 6 1 ,  a United States Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a 
federal district court1 s ruling on the administration of Chicago' s cen­
sorship ordinance .  Zenith International Films,  69 the appellant in this 
case, was offered a limited permit to show the movie The Lovers . 
The permit was issued contingent upon the deletion of several sex 
scenes that had been found obscene by the police commissioner' s re-
view board. A hearing resulted in an abortive attempt to resolve the 
situation, after which the mayor was consulted on the issue of the per-
mit. Subsequently, the mayor declined an appeal on the motion pie-
ture' s exhibition. The corporatio� then filed suit in a federal district 
court, seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief. The corporation 
also as serted that the ordinance was a prior restraint on free expres-
sion and provided no definite standards whereby to judge the alleged 
69 Zenith International Film Corporation v .  City of Chicago, 
183  F. Supp. 623 (N. D .  Ill. 19 60) , vacated, 2 9 1  F .  2d 785,  ( 7th Cir . . 
1 9 6 1 ) .  
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obscenity. The district court ruled that the methods applied to deter -
mine obscenity and procedures involved were consistent with the United 
States Supreme Court' s ruling in R oth and Kingsley, respectively. The 
p laintiff appealed. 
The appellate court concentrated on the question of prior r e -
straint. It was observed that fundamental in the principles of orderly 
justice are fair and adequate administrative procedures .  A pplying this 
proposition to the present case, the court found that the procedures 
employed were to the contrary. The court offered its explanation in 
this form: 
• . • .  
Zenith has been deprived of its right to a full hear­
ing • . . . There was no opportunity for any sort of fair 
hearing before municipal authorities; Z enith had no oppor ­
tunity to present evidence of contemporary community stan­
dards; the . • .  officials failed to view the film as  a whole 
• . . .  thus • • •  they could not apply the proper standards; 
there wa s no de � hearing before the Mayor; the sole 
group that saw the film was a Film R eview Board whose 
procedure does not allow for a hearing; no safeguards to 
preclude any arbitrary judgment . . . •  and . . .  Zenith 
was given no indication why the city found the film to be 
" obscene and immoral" . 70 
The court found that because of the aforementioned instance s  
the procedural due proce ss  guarantees set down in Kingsley 7 1  had been 
violated . The case was remanded to the district court ordering the 
city to permit the exhibition of the whole film or grant a hearing with 
standards consonant with due process of law. 
70 29 1 F. Zd at 790 .  
7 1354 U . S. 436 supra. 
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I s  the search of a defendant' s apartment incidental t o  his lawful 
arrest? This question was answered by the Illinois Supreme Court in 
Pe op le v .  Burnett. 72 The defendant was convicted for unlawfully pos­
sessing obscene photographs. Prior to the arrest, a deputy coroner 
entered Burnett• s home and was entertained by two nude women who 
performed a " . • • lewd and lascivious show" 73 in return for twenty 
dollars. Three policemen then arrived on the scene and arrested 
Burnett and the women; following this ,  the police searched the whole 
apartment and discovered a small tin box in the bedroom closet. The 
authorities requested Burnett to open the container, whereupon the 
police found a number of obscene photographs. 
The Illinois Supreme Court first observed that a search incident 
to a lawful arrest is authorized only when " • • . •  it is necessary to 
protect an arresting officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner from 
escaping, or to discover fruits of the crime. "  74 On this issue, the 
Court determined that the search and seizure of the tin box was not 
necessary to protect the authorities or prevent Burnett' s escape. 
Hence, the high state court ruled that the trial court erred in the denial 
of a motion to suppress  the evidence. 
Another major case concerning the seizure of a quantity of 
7220 Ill. 2d 624, 170  N. E.  Zd 546 ( 1960).  
73  Id. at 625. 
74Id. 
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allegedly obscene books involved one Gilbert Kimmel, 75  an  owner of a 
bookstore in Chicago, who was charged with posses sion of obscene 
books with the intent to commercially disseminate such material. A ct­
ing under the authority of an Illinois obscenity statute, 76 police office r s ,  
armed with a search warrant, proceeded t o  Kimmel' s bookstore and 
seized a large quantity of obscene books. During the search, the law 
enforcement officials seized more than was stipulated on the search 
warrant. A s  a result, 1 500  copies of allegedly obscene books and maga-
zines were confiscated. The tl'.ial court judge rebutted arguments con-
cerning the constitutionality of the statute and the methods employed 
during the search. 
The Supreme Court of Illinois sustained the constitutionality of 
the statute, but ruled on the purported illegal search and seizure. It 
was first recognized that only four books were listed on the warrant, 
whereas the authorities had seized over 1 3 0  separate titles .  The Court 
ruled that the police had used the warrant as a 11 • • • •  license for a general 
search, and they took advantage of their pre sence in the bookstore to 
ferret out and seize whatever they considered to be contraband. 1 1 77 
The supreme court held that p.o'lice officers  conducting an ad hoc 
75 People v .  Kimmel, 34 Ill. 2d 578, 2 1 7  N . E. 2d 785 ( 1966} . 
76 ILL. R EV. STA T .  chap. 38, par . 1 1 -20 (a) 1963 .  
77 34  Ill. 2d 5 78 at 582 .  The principle elements used to  support 
this finding were from the Marcus and Stanford decisions. 367 U . S .  
7 1 7  supra; 379 U . S .  476 ( 1965} . 
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determination of obscenity without an opportunity for deliberation was 
incompatible with Fourth Amendment provisions. The Court also ob-
served that the warrant was designed to suppress  any future sales of 
the books since the warrant specifically instructed the police to 1 1 • . . . 
seize all copies . . •  1 1 of the materials in question. 78 Such a broad 
restriction without a hearing could not, in the Courtr s opinion, be har -
monious with First Amendment freedoms .  
T o  recapitulate, the Illinois Supreme Court took these positions: 
( 1 )  a search warrant must specifically de scribe the place, person, and 
articles to be searched or seized; {2 )  an ad hoc determination of obscenity 
by police officers without a hearing is inconsistent with First Amend-
ment protections; and ( 3) alleged obscene materials are not the same as  
contraband, i . e. ,  narcotics and gambling paraphernalia. 
The City of Chicago' s motion picture ordinance again cam·e under 
attack in the Cusack79 case. The Motion Picture Appeal Board denied 
a permit to exhibit the movies R ent � Girl and Body of a Female
80 in 
public theaters throughout the Chicago area. A s  a result, the appel-
lants filed suit in the Illinois Supreme Court, s eeking relief on the 
grounds that: ( 1 )  procedures for administering the ordinance violated 
78 34  Ill. 2d at 584. 
79cusack v. T eitel Film Corporation, 38 Ill. 2d 53, 230 N .  E.  
241 , rev'd per  curiam, 390
-U . S .  139  ( 1968). 
in sex. 
80The trial court found the movies to appeal to deviant interests 
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procedural due process and freedom of expression, and (2)  the films 
were not obscene. 
Chief Justice Solfisburg of the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed 
the circuit court' s decision and ruled th at the time period81  from the 
initial submission of the silm to the final decision of the appeal board 
constituted no violation of prior restraint or due process of law . More-
over, it was found that the film exhibitors had been provided with ample 
opportunities for a full judicial review and resolution which the court 
viewed as  reasonably necessary to insure an 1 1  
• • • •  intelligent and 
careful consideration by both the Film R eview Section and the appeal 
board of the material in question. 1 1 82 
The aspect of the procedure that the Gourt questioned most was 
the .time period allotted the state to initiate permanent injunction pro-
ceedings after the permit had been denied. It was noted that the city 
took ten days to file for injunctive relief, whereas a circuit court rule 
allowed only five days for such a proceeding. Nevertheles s ,  the Illinois 
Supreme Court treated this delay as not inconsistent with First and 
Fourteenth A mendment protections. The Court cited Freedman, and 
concluded that the appellant' s contentions of abridged constitutional 
rights could not be measured in terms of days or weeks since the film 
8 1 The ordinance provided for a maximum of 50 days to final 
judicial resolution; however,  both films required 68 and 190 days, r e ­
spectively. 
82 38 Ill. 2d at 64. 
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corporation caused some of the delays in the hearings .  83 
Focusing on the alleged obscenity of the films ,  the Court first 
noted that guidelines had been established for determining obscenity 
by the United States Supreme Court in.li.2.th and subsequent case s .  The 
appellants ,  on the other hand, challenged the trial court' s application 
of certain standards to the film s .  Overruling this complaint, the Illinois 
Supreme Court held that the lower court judiciously applied the standard s 
in a proper fashion. Mo·r eover, the Court took considerable pains to 
discuss the complexity and difficulty involved in establishing an adequate 
definition of obscenity. 
However , the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the appellant st  
argument that the " • • •  material' s intent to arouse sexual desire in 
the average per son" would not provide a sufficient basis for determining 
a particular film to be obscene. 84 A lthough this a s sertion provided 
some basis for the film corporation' s argument, it did not per suade 
the court to hold that the company had been denied its constitutional 
rights. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the ordinance85 and 
83rd. at 63 .  
84Id. at 68 -69 .  
85This decision was overturned one year later by the United 
States Supreme Court on the grounds that: ( 1) the 50 to 57 days pro­
vided by the ordinance failed to specify " . . .  a brief time period to 
either is sue a license or go to court to seek an injunction, 1 1  and ( 2)  
1 1  
• • •  failed to as sure a prompt final judicial decision to minimize the 
deterrent effect of an interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license. 1 1  
390 U . S .  at 1 4 1 .  
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affirmed the obscenity of the films because they were merely storie s 
of one sexual encounter after another. 
Conclusion 
With respect to the procedural cases involving obscenity, the 
Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that motion picture censor ship 
ordinances are constitutionally valid, provided that the administration 
of such ordinance s  affords the individual a prompt and impartial judi­
cial determination and a reasonable exercise of due process of law. 
In effect, the state supreme court has been prompted to follow the letter 
of the Kingsley and Freedman decis.ions. 
The decisions on searches and seizures in obscenity cases have 
additionally subscribed to the United States Supreme Court' s ruling in 
Marcus. The high state court has maintained that police may not use 
a warrant as a general search to seize what they think to be as obscene 
material. In the final analysis, the Illinois Supreme Court has avoided 
the prior adversary hearing issue. It can be as sumed that this posi­
tion reflects a reluctance to decide on the question because the United 
States Supreme C ourt has not set forth any definitive ruling. 
CHAPTER IV 
IMPACT ANALYSIS UPON PROSECUTORS 
IN OBSCENITY DECISIONS 
Introduction 
A relatively new approach within the field of judicial behavior 
i s  that of impact analysis.  1 This method has prompted numerous polit-
ical scientists and sociologists to scrutinize various aspects of the 
legal process.  In effect, it has contributed to  the construction of  sev-
eral theoretical frameworks2 from which to analyze the impact a judicial 
decision has upon individuals or groups affected by the decision. These 
"actors" in the political milieu usually comprise public officials, en-
forcement personnel, interest groups ,  and the individual citizen. 
R ecent developments of impact analysis have produced beneficial 
1Stephen L. Wasby has written an extensive volume concerning 
impact analysis;  see The Impact of United States Supreme Court Deci­
sions: Some Perspectives (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press ,  1 970) . 
2For an elaborate application of the Eastonian systems analy­
sis,  readers should consult Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P .  Jahnige, 
The Federal Courts A s  A Political System (New York: Harper and 
R ow Publishing Company, 1 9 7 1 ) .  
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result s .  R obert Birkby3 of Vanderbilt University studied the impact 
of the Schempp 4 decision upon local school districts in T ennessee.  He 
found that a greater portion of the respondents had actually evaded the 
Supreme Court' s ruling. In �ddition, Thomas Barth conducted a survey 
of the attitude s  and v iewpoints of Wisconsin district attorneys ,  legisla-
tors ,  law enforcement officials ,  and booksellers with respect to some 
of the major Supreme Court obscenity decisions. 5 Theodore Becker, 
has edited a book containing numerous empirical studies of impact: anal­
ysi s .  6 Many of the articles provide an extensive investigation into the 
effects of some of the Supreme Courtf s landmark civil liberties decisions. 
In summary, impact analysis has attempted to aid socia 1 sci en-
tists and political scientists in their efforts to ascertain the effects a 
specific court decision has upon the relevant actors within the political 
environment. Future research may significantly augment empirical 
. analyses with the judicial proc e s s .  
3 
R obert Birkby, "The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Ten-
nessee R eaction to the 'Schempp' Decision, " 10 Midwest Journal of 
Political Science 304- 19  ( 1966) . 
4 3 74 U . S. 2 0 3  ( 1963) .  It was ruled that Bible-reading and recita-
1 tion of the Lord' s Prayer in public schools are violative of the religion 
clauses of the First A mendment. 
5Thomas E.  Barth, 11 Perception and Acceptance of Supreme Court 
Decisions at the State and Local Level, 1 1 1 7  Journal of Public Law 308-50 
( 1 9 68) . 
6 Theodore Becker, ed. , The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions 
(New York: Oxford Press ,  1969} .  
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Objectives of the Study 
The cardinal purpose of this chapter is  to measure and ascertain 
the attitudes and viewpoints of a select number of county prosecuting 
attorneys who are involved with the enforcement of Illinois ' s obscenity 
statute. More specifically, the following are the objectives of this in-
v estigation: 
1 .  T o  measure the impact a specific obscenity decision has 
upon the �nforcement of the state law. In other word s ,  do the respond-
ents perceive these decisions as beneficial, detrimental, or as having 
no effect upon the enforcement of the state obscenity law ? 
2 .  T o  determine how prosecuting attorneys evaluate Illinois' 
existing obscenity law; that is ,  should additional legislation be provided 
to broaden the scope of obscenity enforcement ?  
Hypothe ses Employed 
The following hypotheses were employed to correspond to each 
. . h 7 question in t e survey. 
1 .  The frequency of obscenity litigation will be greater in urban 
than in rural counties. 
2 .  8 The more urban a county the greater will be the variety of 
7 See Appendix infra. 
8 A cco�ding to the United States Bureau of the Census , a given 
area that exceeds a population of 50,  000 is cla s s ified as a Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical A r ea (SMSA)".  T�us, in this study, an urban 
county will be equivalent to an SMSA. R ural counties will indicate a 
population of less than 50,  000. See T able 1 .  
1 0 1  
s exually-oriented material. 
3 .  The more urban a county i s ,  a s  measured by population, 
the more probable it is  that a prosecuting attorney will have an accu-
rate knowledge of obscenity decisions. 9 
The counties included in this survey are listed in Table 1 .  
TABLE 1 
COUNTIES AND THEIR POPULA TIONsl O  
R ural Counties Population Urban Counties Population 
Clark 1 6 , 082 Champaign 162 ,  1 0 7  
Coles 47, 336  Macon 1 2 3 , 926 
Effingham 24, 365 McLean 1 0 3 , 308 
Jefferson 3 1 , 067 Peoria 1 93 , 9 8 1  
Saline 25 ,  194 Sangamon 159, 432 
William·son 47, 552 St. Clair 2 79 , 601 
The amount of data obtained in this survey was based on ques -
tionnaire s  mailed to twelve county district attorneys in the state of 
Illinois .  The questionnaires wer e mailed to six urban and six rural 
counties in early June of 1972 .  Prosecutors from Saline, Effingham , 
and Sangamon countie s  failed to respond to the survey. Thus, a total 
9In addition to examining knowledgeability of obscenity cases,  
this investigation will also examine the extent to which prosecutors 
from the most urbanized counties make comments concerning the Illi­
nois obscenity statute. 
l OLuman H. Long, ed. , The World A lmanac (New York: News­
paper Enterprise A s sociation, 1971 ) ,  pp. 447-8 .  
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1 1  of 75 per cent of the questionnaires were returned. 
A major reason why pros ecuting attorneys were selected for 
this survey is that they are generally cognizant of the r elevant state 
and federal obscenity decisions. Moreover, thes e  states attorneys 
are primarily involved with the enforcement of the state obscenity 
law. 
Frequency of Obscenity Prosecutions 
The first question in the survey deals with the amount of ob-
scenity cases within a respective county. The respondent was confronted 
with this question: About how many obscenity prosecutions are handled 
by you in your jurisdiction? Approximately 80 per cent of the respond-
ents from the urban counties indicated that, on the average, two to five 
cases are prosecuted yearly. Most of the respondents did not indicate 
what type of cases were prosecuted. However, one stated that he had 
successfully enjoined the operation of an adult book store and an X-rated 
movie from a drive-in theater.  
Seventy-five per cent of the respondents from the rural counties 
indicated that they had never pros ecuted any obscenity cases.  Further -
more, no attempt was made on their part t o  complete the questionnaire .  
One respondent went so far as  to indicate that a cas e  could not be  won. 
This response undoubtedly reflects the confusion and frustration en-
l lrt is this author1 s opinion that future studies be supplemented 
with personal interviews. Extreme difficulty was encountered with re­
spect to obtaining responses from the district attorneys.  
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countered by a prosecutor when attempting t o  suppress  material which 
he considers to be obscene. 
Two glaring exceptions remain, however.  A prosecuting attar-
ney from the most heavily populated county surveyed in this st�dy indi-
cated that no obscenity cases were pending or ever adjudicated within 
his jurisdiction; he even " . . .  contemplated none in the future. 1 1  In con-
trast, a respondent from a rural county stated that he had been succe s s -
ful in winning four obscenity lawsuits and that he had obtained 1 1  • • •  sat is  -
factory remedies in approximately ten additional cases through inv esti-
gati.ve and administrative efforts . "  1 2  Thus, the skeletal evidenc'e ob-
tained in this modest survey indicates that the relative size of a given 
jurisdiction has no relationship to the frequency of obscenity litigation. 
Diversity of Sexually-Oriented Material 
This portion of the questionaire is concerned with the variety of 
sexually-oriented material in obscenity prosecutions.  More specifically, 
the respondents were asked to identify certain kinds of sexual material 
pre sent within their respective counties .  The categories are a s  follows: 
1 .  11  girlie" magazines 
2 .  nudist magazines 
1 2The s e  inconsistencies might be explained by a number of unique 
demographic variables that are characteristic of specific counties .  A 
university situated in a rural town could indicate an increase in the avail­
ability of sexual material. Given the above exceptions, howev er, it can 
be assumed that obscenity litigation was more fr equent within urban 
rather than rural jurisdictions. 
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3 .  pulp novels 
4. sado-masochistic materials 
5 .  film s 
6 .  others {please explain} 
Eighty per cent of the respondents from urban counties indicated 
a variety of sexual material within their jurisdictions; l3  only 25  per 
cent indicated a variety of such material in rural counties. From the 
aforementioned data, the evidence suggests that the second hypothesis 
would appear to be confirmed, namely that a greater diversity of sexually-
oriented material does exist within the more ur'Qan counties .  
Impact of Judicial Decisions 
In this part of the questionnaire, six major federal obscenity 
decisions were mentioned in order to determine their poss�ble impact 
upon obscenity enforcement within the r espondents'  jurisdictions. The 
respondents were requested to indicate their interpretations of the de-
cisions by checking the appropriate space. The responses were  then 
coded and placed into the following categories: 
Positive 
Negative 
Neutral 
1 .  Greatly helped 
2 .  Helped 
3 .  Hindered 
4. Greatly hindered 
5 . No response 
6 .  Decision had no effect 
13Motion pictures depicting s exual behavior and paper-back 
novels received the highest number of response s .  
1 0 5  
Federal Decisions 
The respondents were first asked to indicate whether the R oth-
A lberts 1 4  decision had any discernible impact upon obscenity enforce-
ment. The data exhibited in Table 2 indicates a neutral attitude con-
cerning the R oth-Alberts decision. Moreover, 75 per cent of the re-
spondents from the rural counties took no position on the case.  
T ABLE 2 
R EACTION OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS 
TO R OTH-A LBER TS 
Number Per 
R esponse Urban R ural Urban 
Positive 40% 
· Greatly helped 0 0 
Helped 2 1 
Negative 20% 
Hindered 1 0 
Greatly hindered 0 0 
Neutral 40% 
Had no effect 1 0 
No response 1 3 
Total N • 9 5 4 1 0 0% 
C ent 
R ural 
2 5% 
0% 
75% 
1 00% 
14This historic case marked the first time the United States 
Supreme Court dealt with the obscenity is sue. '� Obs·c;enity,. ·in the .Court' s 
language, is designed to appeal to the prurient interest of sex, thus 
constitutionally excluding it from federally protected expression. 
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One urban county respondent stated that the decision "had no 
effect" , but said it was incorporated into the Illinois obscenity statute.  
In  effect, according to the respondents,  the 1957  decision aided enforce-
ment personnel in their attempts to proscribe obscene material. To 
summarize, 40 per cent urban and 25 per cent rural county prosecutors 
peraeived .R oth-Alberts as beneficial to the enforcement of the state' s 
obscenity law. 
Table 3 indicates the response to the Jacobellis decision. 
T A BLE 3 
.R EACTION OF PROSECUTING A TTORNEYS 
TO JACOBELLIS 
.R esponse Number Per Urban R ural Urban 
Positive 0% 
Greatly helped 0 0 
Helped 0 0 
Negative 60% 
Hindered 3 0 
Greatly hindered 0 0 
Neutral 40% 
Had no effect 1 l 
No response l 3 
T otal N - 9 5 4 1 00% 
Cent 
.R ural 
0% 
0% 
1 00% 
100% 
That ruling was concerned with a book' s social worth. It was held by 
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the Court that before a work can be  deemed obscene, it must be  "utterly 
without social value". Sixty per cent of the respondents from the urban 
counties r evealed that the decision hindered or had no effect upon en-
forcement of the statute. More importantly, not one respondent stated 
that Jacobellis had a positive effect upon obscenity prosecutions .  
The reactions to Ginzburg and Mishkin are noted in Tables 4 and 5 ,  
respectively. Ginzburg, it will be recalled, criminally prohibited a 
publisher ' s  advertising practices with respect to selling sexual litera-
ture. Thus the Ginzburg ruling provided enforcement machinery with 
an additional means of securing obscenity convictions.  
TABLE 4 
R EA C T ION OF PR OSECUTING A TTORNEYS 
TO GINZBURG 
R esponse Number Urban R ural 
Positive 
Greatly helped 0 0 
Helped 3 1 
Negative 
Hindered 0 0 
Greatly hindered 0 0 
Neutral 
Had no effect 1 0 
No re sponse 1 3 
T otal N = 9 5 4 
Per Cent 
Urban R ural 
60% 2 5% 
0% 0% 
40% 75% 
1 00% 1 0 0% 
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Mishkin, in addition, punished the sale of sexual material designed to 
appeal to a specific group of people. , .  � .  ,.-
TA BLE 5 
R E.ACTION OF PR OSECUTING ATTORNEYS 
TO MISHKIN 
R esponse Number Per Cent Urban R ural Urban R ural 
Positive 60% 25% 
Gr eatly helped 0 0 
t:Jelped 3 1 
Negative 0% 0% 
Hindered 0 0 
Greatly hindered 0 0 
Neutral 40% 75% 
Had no effect 1 0 
No response 1 3 
T otal N = 9 5 4 100% 100% 
Sixty per cent of the urban prosecutors responded favorably to the rulings. 
A gain, only one respondent from the rural counties indicated that both 
decisions aided obscenity enforcement. 
The next case that was mentioned in the questionnaire was the 
Stanley 1 5  decision. In 1969,  the Supreme Court held that mere private 
1 5The decision generated a great amount of controversy. Legal 
publications were intimating that the right to receive ideas parallels the 
right to distribute them. See 1 1Pr,ivate Possession of Obscene Material, 1 1 
83  HAR V .  L. R EV .  I, 1 49 - 50 ( 1969) . 
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posses sion of s exually-oriented material does not constitute a criminal 
offense. With respect to obscenity enforcement, this ruling barred . 
authoritie's from seizing obscene literature within an individua P s  home. 
Eighty per cent of the urban respondents signified that the decision 
had no effect upon enforcement of the law. One hundred per cent of the 
rural r espondents indicated a "no response" or "neutral" position. The 
evidence seems to indicate that the prosecutors in the most urbanized 
counties surveyed in this investigation have a more accurate knowledge 
of federal obscenity decisions. l 6  
T A B LE 6 
R EACTION OF PROSECUTING ATTOR NEYS 
TO STANLEY 
R es ponses 
Number 
Urban Rural 
Positive 
Greatly helped 0 0 
Helped 0 0 
Negative 
Hindered 1 0 
Greatly hindered 0 0 
Neutral 
Had no effect 3 1 
No response 1 3 
Per C ent 
Urban R ural 
0% 0% 
20% 0% 
80% 1 00% 
T otal N • 9 5 4 1 00% 1 00% 
l6This conclusion appears to b e  valid; based on available data, 
however, a m ore  elaborate study could reveal additional important r e ­
lationships .  
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United States v .  R eidel was the la st federal obscenity decision. 
This ruling sanctioned Congressional authority to prohibit the mailing 
of obscene material to consenting adult s .  1 7  The reaction to the decision 
indicates a general consensus that it aided in the enforcement of obscenity 
laws,  for 80 per cent of the urban prosecutors responded favorably to 
� eidel. The reactions are coded in Table 7 .  
T A B LE 7 
REACTIONS OF PR OSECUTING AT TORNEYS 
TO R EIDEL 
R e sponses Number Per Urban R ural Urban 
Positive 80% 
Greatly helped 0 0 
Helped 4 1 
Negative 0% 
Hindered 0 0 
Greatly hindered 0 0 
Neutral 20% 
Had no effect 0 0 
No response 1 3 
Total N • 9 5 4 100% 
Cent 
R ural 
2 5% 
P% 
75% 
1 00% 
1 7 In the op ion of this author ,  the decision should have no effect 
on the enforcement of state obscenity statutes .  R ather, it i s  concerned 
with a federal postal statute.  The respondents ,  however, seemed to 
concur with the ruling. 
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R eactions to Supplementary Decisions 
This segment of the questionnaire was concerned with obscenity 
decisions other than the ones mentioned in the survey. The respondents 
were then asked this question: "Are  there any supplementary state or 
federal decisions which have had an impact on your obscenity prosecu-
tions ? 1 1  
It should be specifically noted that all of the rural respondents 
failed to indicate whether any supplementary decisions had an impact 
upon obscenity enforcement. This probably reflects the greater infre­
quency of  obscenity prosecutions within rural jurisdictions. In contrast, 
80 per cent of the urban respondents cited the R idens case in which it 
was held that portraying sexual relations as  11 suggested and imminent" 
is obscene. One of the attorneys offered this interpretation: 1 1  
• • •  the 
decision clarified the right to arrest and burden of proof for the prose­
cution. 1 1  This is a correct interpretation of the decision because the 
Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the pictorial magazines alone pro­
vided sufficient proof to support a conviction of obscenity. Another indi­
vidual commented that the Geraci case is beneficial to the enforcement 
of the state obscenity law . The Geraci case dealt with a variety of 
sexually-oriented material. The high state court distinguished between 
the contents of each as a factor contributing to their conviction and pro­
tection. He noted that 11 • • •  Geraci spelled out what types of material 
can be proscribed . " 
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To conclude, hypothesis number 3 tends to be confirmed because 
the rural respondents failed to indicate any discernible impact. For the 
most part, this evidence lends support to the as sumption that the urban 
prosecutors were considerably more knowledgeable about recent state 
obscenity prosecutions than their rural counterparts. 
Viewpoint Toward Existing Obscenity Statute 
The remaining portion of the survey deals with the attitudes and 
positions concerning Illinois' obscenity law. Moreover, the questions 
were designed in connection with attempting to substantiate hypothesis 
number 3 .  The respondents were asked to comment on whether the ex­
isting statute needed any additional provisions that would facilitate ob ­
scenity prosecutions. Questions 4, 5 ,  and 6 are related to this area. 
Question number 4 reads as follows: 1 1The State of Illinois needs 
to develop additional legislation which will prevent the distribution of 
obscene material to all adults .  f f  The respondents were asked to agree  
or disagree with this statement; additional space was provided for ex­
planatory comments. Eighty p er cent of the urban prosecutors indicated 
that the existing obscenity statute was sufficient. However,  one responded 
that some measure should be adopted to " . • •  prevent X-rated movies 
from being exhibited at outdoor theaters.  1 1  In contrast to the urban pro­
secutors,  only 2 5  per cent of the rural prosecutor s agreed that the statute 
was adequate. Seventy-five percent of the rural r espondents offered 
no response .  Table 8 clearly indicate s  the result s .  
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T ABLE 8 
Comment 
Urban 
R ural 
R ural = 4 
Urban • 5 
80% 
2 5% 
N = 9 
' 
No Comment 
2q% 
75% 
The fifth question was a follow-up to question number 4.  It 
stated, "The State of Illinois needs to develop additional legislation 
which applies only to the distribution of obscene materials to juveniles 
while at the same time allowing adults to view or read any material 
they please.  1 1  Approximately 80 per cent of the urban prosecutors dis-
agreed with the proposition; however one r e spondent indicated that such 
legislation is 1 1p  lausib le" and " capable of being enforced"'. Twenty-five 
per cent of the rural county prosecutors responded unfavorably to the 
question; the remaining 75 per cent did not respond to the proposition. 
The data is presented in Table 9 .  
T ABLE 9 
Comment 
Urban 
R ural 
R ural = 4 
Urban .. 5 
80% 
25% 
No Comment 
20% 
75% 
N - 9 
1 14 
Question number 6 was also concerned with additional obscenity 
legislation. It stated, " The State of Illinois should develop additional 
legislation which will prevent the distribution of obscene materials to 
both vulnerableI 8  adults and minors . 1 1  Eighty per cent of the urban re-
spondents indicated an unfavorable response. One urban respondent, 
however, indicated that such legislation was feasible. On the other 
hand, twenty-five per-.cent of the rural respondents offered a negative 
reaction to the question. A gain, 75 per cent of the rural prosecutors 
indicated no response.  The data is presented in Table I O .  
TA BLE IO  
Comment No Comment 
Urban 
R ural 
R ural = 4 
Urban = 5 
80% 
2 5% 
20% 
75% 
N = 9 
\ 
The data presented in Tables 8 ,  9 ,  and I O  reflect varying degrees 
of knowledgeability cone erning obscenity legislation. It is clear that the 
prosecutors from the urban counties made more comments concerning 
the statutes than did the prosecutors from the rural counties; this would 
I 8The word "vulnerable" denotes persons who might be damaged 
by exposure to sexually- oriented material. In other words ,  the viewing 
of this material could induee anti- social behavior, i . e . , forceable rape, 
voyeurism, and exhibitionism. 
1 1 5  
appear to indicate a greater knowledgeability on the part of the urban 
prosecutors .  Moreover, the neutral r e sponses seem t o  indicate their 
knowledgeability of ob�cenity legislation. 
A lthough the data reveals that urban prosecutors tend to be more 
knowledgeable about obscenity, respondents from both jurisdictions 
seemed to express  a considerable measure of cohesion on those que s -
tions pertaining to obscenity legislation. The apparent similarities 
seem to indicate a reluctance to support any additional obscenity legis-
l t .  19  a ion. 
Conceptions of "Obscenity" and 
"Hard-Core Pornography11 
The s eventh question in thi s study relates to definitions concern-
ing obscenity and hard -core  pornography. The prosecutors were asked: 
1 1How would you distinguish between obscene material and hard-core 
pornography? 11 This question was designed to determine whether any 
general consensus existed among the respondents .  
Eighty per  cent of the urban county respondents did not attempt 
to define either term. One respondent, however,  remarked that 1 1  • • • 
hard -core pornography can be included within the definition of obscenity 
. . .  more erotic variety of obscene material. 1 1  
Fifty per cent of the rural county prosecutors did not assume 
1 9rt is this author1 s personal opinion that such responses are 
indicative of the difficulty in properly securing a judicial determination 
of the nature of obscenity. 
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any position. Yet, the remaining 50 per cent did respond to the ques-
tion. One stated that 1 1  • • •  no distinction exists from a legal standpoint. 1 1  
A nother prosecutor indicated that he 1 1  
• • •  cantt define it • • . •  it1 s dis-
. , ,20 gusting. 
In the last analysis,  the "neutral" positions assumed by a large 
percentage of both the rural and urban prosecutors indicates an obvious 
unwillingne ss  to form any conception of the two terms,  namely, por-
nography and obscenity. This consensus clearly reflects the confusion 
that pervades every aspect of the obscenity controversy in the legal 
arena. 
Conclusion 
This modest survey of nine individuals who are involved with 
the enforcement of Illinois' obscenity statute can be summarized in the 
following manner: 
1 .  It was found that the frequency of obscenity prosecutions 
was greater in the urban jurisdictions .  But, it is important to note 
that one rural respondent prosecuted more obscenity cases than any 
of the urban county prosecutors.  In addition, a respondent from the 
most heavily populated urban county had never prosecuted a single ob-
scenity case.  A lthough the evidence seems to indicate that urban pro-
secutors handle more obscenity cases than their rural counterparts, 
20rt should be noted that this pz:oosecutor has never received a 
single obscenity complaint. 
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the exceptions noted above do not lend strong support to the proposition 
that obscenity cases exist at a higher rate in urban areas.  
2 .  In contrast, there i s  a positive relationship between the 
variety of s exual literature and the degree of urbanism within a given 
county. 
3 .  A large majority of urban county prosecutors seemed to 
agree upon what they considered as positive, negative ,  and neutral im­
pacts of the various United States Supreme Court obscenity decisions 
utilized in this survey. This evidence lends support to the proposition 
that urban prosecutors are more knowledgeable about the nature of ob­
scenity. In essence, the urban prosecutors exhibited a greater accuracy 
of knowledge concerning the relevant obscenity decisions. 
Approximately 75 per cent of the rural respondents failed to p er­
ceive any impact of  thes e  obscenity decisions . It would seem that this 
lack of knowledge concerning obscenity decisions probably reflects the 
fact that a great number of them had never prosecuted any obscenity 
case s .  Thus, this limited data suggests that ther e may b e  a positive 
relationship between the frequency of obscenity litigation within a given 
county and the accuracy of the re spondentr s interpretation of an obscenity 
decision. 
4. Sixty per cent of the urban respondents exhibited some knowl­
edge of supplementary state obscenity cases . Those who cited R idens 
and Geraci reflected an accurate knowledge of these decisions. There-
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fore, on the basis of this limited data, there would appear to be a posi-
tive relationship between those active in obscenity prosecutions and an 
accurate knowledge of recent state obscenity decisions. 
5. There is considerable agreement among the urban county pro-
secutors that the state obscenity statute is adequate.  Despite this posi-
tion, some 20 per cent of the urban respondents have expressed the view 
that the existing Illinois law should be broadened to prevent the exhibi-
tion of X-rated films at outdoor theaters .  One prosecutor went even 
further;  he indicated a desire for more emphasis on prev enting the dis-
tribution of obscene materials to minors and susceptible adult s .  2 1  
Seventy-five per cent of 'the rural respondents failed to comment on the 
state statute.  
6 .  Finally, 80 per  cent of the urban respondents failed to  formulate 
any conception of obscenity and hard -core pornography. In addition, 
50 per cent of the rural prosecutors offered no comment. This sketchy 
evidence suggests a pattern among both groups of attorneys, namely 
that the respondents seem to be confused concerning the concepts of 
22 obscenity and hard -core pornography. 
2 1 This respondent failed to define the term, " susceptible adult" . 
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This author is  of  the opinion that the inability of  these respond-
ents ,  both urban and rural, to formulate a definition of obscenity or 
hard-core pornography reflects the failure of the federal and Illinois 
judicial systems to develop adequate standards in evaluating what might 
be considered obscene. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERA L  CONCLUSIONS 
With the advent of the historic R oth decision, the United States 
Supreme Court has been inundated with a mass of obscenity litigation. 
The Court has valiantly attempted to objectively define the term "ob ­
scene!'� but has wallowed in a mire of confusion, chaos ,  and public 
hostility. A s  a result, no clear majority opinion exists among the 
members of the Court. The breadth of these opinions has ranged from 
complete protection to state proscription and to suppressing only what 
has been termed "hard -core pornography . "  Out of this perplexity, how­
ever, the C ourt has professed that material can be· determined obscene 
if it appeals to the prurient interest of sex, is patently offensi'v. e, and is 
utterly without socially redeeming qualities.  It is  important to note 
that the justices do not entirely agree on any of the aforementioned cri-
teria . . 
Up until the Ginzburg decision, the Court did not sustain one 
conviction of obscenity. The vast diversity of material brought before 
the Court has only served to exacerbate any attempts to formulate a 
viable conception of obscenity. Ginzburg, however,  opened a new 
1 1 9  
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avenue to obscenity enforcement. It ruled that, in addition to the stan­
dard tests of obscenity, the advertising practices· and intentions of a 
publisher can be used to secure a judicial determination of obscenity. 
This "pandering" rule has undoubtedly facilitated efforts to punish ind i ­
vid uals who create and disseminate such material. But since that time, 
the Court has been reluctant to employ the doctrine. 
W ithin the last few years,  the Supreme Court has indicated a 
desire to proscribe material whi:ch describes or represents graphic 
s exual behavior. Moreover, the Court has expressed great concern 
with respect to shielding juveniles and unwilling adults from exposure 
to sexually-oriented material. 
In 1969,  the Court placed itself in an awkward position when it 
held that an individual may read or view sexually-oriented material 
within the sanctuary of his own home. The implications were apparent; 
if one could read this material, then someone should be able to distri&­
ute it to him. Thus, the Supreme Court was faced with the situation of 
completely abolishing all restraints on the diss emination of such mater­
ial. Yet, two decisions of the 1970 term clarified this matter.  The 
Court effectively reaffirmed its prior position as expounded in the land­
mark R oth decision. W ith this in mind, the present status of sexually­
oriented material is that standards can be used to determine obscenity, 
but law enforcement attempts to suppress  such material stops at the 
door to one1 s home. Therefore, an individual can peruse whatever 
1 2 1  
material he pleases provided that he choos es modes of distribution 
other than commercial distribution and importation from a foreign 
source. 
A review of the Illinois obscenity decisions indicates that the 
high state court has voluntarily followed the m·andates of the Supreme 
Court. In addition, it has agreed with the variety of standards used to 
determine obscenity. At times,  however, the Illinois Supreme Court 
has revealed a considerable amount of confusion surrounding the issue. 
It may be pointed out that the uncertainty among the members of the 
United States Supreme Court has permeated the lower courts .  A clear 
example of this is the latest state obscenity conviction. The Supreme 
Court of Illinois a sserted a willingness to mc;ke an independent deter­
mination of obscenity by ruling that material depicting sexual conduct 
as  " suggested and imminent" is ·o bscene. This seems to suggest a 
broadening of the state• s police power to criminally punish material 
that does not exp licitly portray s exual activity. 
The chapter concerning impact analysis upon prosecuting attor­
neys in the area of obscenity enforcement revealed some s ignificant 
although tentative results. It was found that the more urban a county, 
the greater will be the variety of sexual material and frequency of ob­
scenity prosecutions. 
Another salient pattern appeared. A majority of the urban 
county prosecutor s exhibited greater knowledgeability about obscenity 
1 2 2  
decisions, and the extant Illinois statute than did their rural counter-
parts .  
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APPENDIX 
Obscenity Questionnaire- -Prosecuting Attorneys 
OBSCENITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
A .  1 .  A bout how many obscenity prosecutions are handled by you in 
your jurisdiction? 
2 .  What types of material are involved in most of your obscenity 
case s ?  (You may check one or more) 
( ) 1 1  girlie" magazines 
{ ) nudist magazines 
{ ) pulp novels 
( ) sado-masochistic materials 
( ) films 
( )  others (please explain) ������������������ 
3 .  The following questions concern some major federal obscenity 
decisions. Please indicate what the impact of each decision has 
had on your obscenity prosecutions by checking the appropriate 
box. 
The R oth-Alberts decisions (obscenity i s  not within the area of 
protected speech) . 
( ) greatly helped 
( ) helped 
( ) had no effect 
( ) hindered 
{ ) greatly hindered 
The Jacobellis decision (before material can be proscribed, it 
must be "utterly without social importance" ) .  
{ ) greatly helped 
( ) helped 
( ) had no effect 
( } hindered 
( ) greatly hindered 
1 3 1  
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The Ginzburg decision (advertising practices and intent of pub­
lisher to exploit and titillate matters of sexual description can 
be used to determine a work obscene) . 
{ ) greatly helped 
( ) helped 
( ) had no effect 
{ } hindered 
{ } greatly hindered 
The Mishkin decision (a state may proscribe material directed 
at the s exual interests of a clearly defined deviant sexual group) . 
( } greatly helped 
( ) helped 
{ ) had no effect 
{ ) hindered 
( ) greatly hindered 
The Stanley decision (private possession of obsc.ene material is 
constitutionally protected) ·' 
( ) greatly helped 
{ ) helped 
{ ) had no effect 
( ) hindered 
( ) greatly hindered 
The R eidel decision (Gongress may prohibit the mailing of ob­
scene materials to consenting adults) . 
( ) greatly helped 
( ) helped 
( ) had no effect 
{ } hindered 
( } greatly hindered 
B .  Please indicate your opinion of each of the follpwing statements;  
if you wish to explain your response, please place your comment 
in the space provided below each question. 
1 3 3  
4 .  The state of Illinois needs to develop additional legislation which 
will prevent the distribution of obscene materials to all adults .  
Why or  Why not? 
5 .  The state of Illinois should develop additional legis lation which 
applies only to the distribution of obscene materials to juveniles 
while at the same time allowing adults to view or read any 
material they please .  
Why or  Why not? 
6 . The state of Illinois should develop additional legislation which 
will prevent the distribution of obscene materials to both vul­
nerable adults (that is,  persons who might be damaged by expo­
sure to such material) and minors.  
Why or Why not? 
7 .  How would you distinguish between obscene material and hard­
core pornography? 
8. A r e  there any supplementary State or Federal decisions which 
have had an impact on your obscenity prosecutions ? 
